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The law of successor criminal liability is simple corporate successors are
liable for the crimes of their predecessors. Always. Any corporation that results
from any merger, consolidation, spin-off etc., is on the hook for all the crimes
of all the corporations that went into the process. Such a coarse-grained, one-
track approach fails to recognize that not all reorganizations are cut from the
same cloth. As a result, it skews corporate incentives against reorganizing in
more socially beneficial ways. It also risks punishing corporate successors
unjustly.
This Article offers a more sophisticated approach to successor liability:
successors hould be liable for the crimes of their predecessors only when they
inherit their predecessors 'compliance vulnerabilities. In the terms developed by
this Article, these successors share a "criminal identity" with their predecessors.
Such an approach would incentivize corporations to structure reorganizations
in ways that improve compliance and minimize the likelihood offuture offenses.
At the same time, it would do a better job of ensuring that the criminal law
punishes corporate successors only when they deserve it.
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"[I/f any fundamental assumption underlies our system,
it is that guilt is personal and not inheritable.-"
I. Introduction
It is not a good idea to punish one person for another's crimes. Doing so is
fundamentally unjust.' It also makes for bad policy if punishment is going to
deter potential criminals, the criminals themselves must suffer the penalty. ' This
bad idea, however, is the settled law where corporate crime is concerned.
Successor corporations are on the hook for the crimes of their predecessors, even
in circumstances where the two seem like very different corporations. One could
imagine some successors wanting to argue, with the corporate equivalent of a
straight face, that they are different from their predecessors. The fact that this
argument is legally foreclosed to them should seem strange.
Imagine what this would mean for individuals. Courts rarely have to ask
whether the defendant before them really is the same person as she was when
she committed some crime. The issue arises only in rare cases of dissociative
identity disorder4 or personality-changing brain trauma.5 Philosophers have had
more to say in fanciful thought experiments where people split and fuse with
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. See Anne-Marie Rhodes, Blood and Behavior, 36 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J.
143, 155 (2010) ("James Madison wrote that the Corruption of Blood Clause was designed to prevent
Congress from [sic] from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of its author. Moreover,
the corruption of the blood clause, which addresses a substantive right of an individual against the
sovereign power, is one of only two such rights directly addressed in the original Constitution. The
independent American perspective was clear, an individual is to be judged on his own actions and behavior
not those of his ancestors." (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)) (quoting Max Stier, Note,
Corruption of Blood and Equal Protection: Why the Sins of the Parents Should Not Matter, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 727, 730 (1992)).
3. See generally Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE. L.J.
1231 (1984) (discussing the limited conditions under which vicarious liability is economically efficient).
4. IAN HACKING, REWRITING THE SOUL: MULTIPLE PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENCES
OF MEMORY (1995); JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES (1996); Robert
Birmingham, From Odysseus to Capgras: Seven Episodes of Personal Identity in Law, 49 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 99, 117-24 (1998); Stephen Braude, Multiple Personality and Moral Responsibility, 3 PHIL.,
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 37 (1996); Kathleen Wilkes, Multiplicity and Personal Identity, 32 BRITISH J.
PHIL. SCI. 331 (1981).
5. Cf. JOHN M. HARLOW, RECOVERY FROM THE PASSAGE OF AN IRON BAR THROUGH
THE HEAD 328-47 (1868) (recounting how the personality of Phineas Gage was radically altered following
an accident in which an iron rod was driven through his head destroying parts of his brain).
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each other. 6 Supposing Dr. Jekyll split into two separate bodies, which body
should be punished for the murder of Sir Danvers Carew? Most people would
think that is an open question and would want to know which body inherited Mr.
Hyde's psychological traits before answering. Supposing instead thatMr. Hyde
then somehow forcibly fused himself with an innocent bystander, most people
would ask what remained of Mr. Hyde and what of the bystander before deciding
whether and how much to punish the composite. No one thinks it makes sense to
punish the individual "successors" as a matter of course Dr. Jekyll, Mr. Hyde,
or the composite with no further questions asked.
These hypos, while outlandish for real people, are business as usual for
corporations. Replace Dr. Jekyll with a parent corporation8 who has a division
with compliance vulnerabilities and a history of past misconduct; the parent may
spin off that division into a separate corporation. Or replace Mr. Hyde and the
bystander with a criminal corporation that, obscuring its earlier misconduct,
merges with a corporation that has a clean record and robust compliance.9 When
6. Derek Parfit, Personal Identity, 80 PHIL. REV. 3, 4-5 (1971) (discussing the
disposition of personal identity following a brain transplant or disconnection of brain hemispheres).
7. Id. at 11-12 (arguing for a psychological continuity account of personal identity).
8. See, e.g., Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fallfrom Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917,
929 n.63 (2003) ("At least one account suggests that Andersen tried to persuade the government to
approve a restructuring that would allow Andersen to spin off the Houston office as a separate entity,
reasoning that the Houston office could then be separately prosecuted without implicating the rest of
the firm. The government persisted in its view that the firm as a whole would have to bear responsibility
for the shredding, so no agreement o that effect was ever reached. But even if a spinoff of the Houston
office had occurred, the restructuring solution would have remained problematic. General principles of
entity liability allow the criminal acts and intent of Andersen's agents to be imputed to the firm. If the
Houston office had been restructured as a separate partnership, the crucial time for determining its status
as a legal entity would have been the time when the criminal conduct occurred. When Andersen partners
and employees shredded the Enron documents, the Houston office had no separate legal identity. Thus,
Andersen was the only entity to which its agents' acts and intent could be imputed.") (citation omitted);
see also Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1986) ("In
anticipation of a potential mass tort, a firm could put the risky product line in a subsidiary corporation so
that the limited liability of the subsidiary might shield the parent firm from mass tort liability. Manville,
for example, separately incorporated its nonasbestos operations when already facing mass tort claims. The
cigarette companies' strategic reaction to suits by plaintiffs with tobacco-induced disease has already
included formation of subsidiaries expressly intended to insulate liability.") (footnote omitted).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Wilshire Oil Co., 427 F.2d 969, 973 (10th Cir. 1970) ("The
brunt of the sufficiency of evidence argument focuses on the propriety of attributing the previously
obtained guilty knowledge of a Riffe Division agent, to Wilshire after the merger .... Wilshire argues
that the only knowledge it could have had regarding their participation in the conspiracy was knowledge
acquired prior to the merger and they are thereby liable for neither the pre-merger crime nor their post-
merger involvement."); see also Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Judiciary Comm., 111 th Cong. 6 (2010) (statement of
Andrew Weissmann, Partner, Jenner & Block LLP) ("Under the current enforcement regime,
a company may be held criminally liable under the FCPA not only for its own actions, but for the actions
of a company that it acquires or becomes associated with via a merger even if those acts took place prior
to the acquisition or merger and were entirely unknown to the acquiring company. Such a standard
of criminal liability is generally antithetical to the goals of the criminal law, including punishing culpable
conduct or deterring offending behavior. While a company may mitigate its risk by conducting due
diligence prior to an acquisition or merger (or, in certain circumstances, immediately following an
acquisition or merger), that does not constitute a legal defense if a matter nevertheless arises that was not
detected. Thus, even when an acquiring company has conducted exhaustive due diligence and
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the "people" at issue are corporations,'0 what were mere thought experiments
become pressing transactional and criminal law policy concerns.
The law of successor liability tells courts when the corporations that emerge
from reorganization (the "successors") should be on the hook for the misdeeds
of the corporations that went into the process (the "predecessors")." Doctrinally,
the answer is simple: always. A corporation that acquires, merges with,
consolidates with, or spins off from a criminal corporation automatically inherits
a criminal taint and is liable for punishment.
Though this miasmic approach would certainly be inappropriate for
individuals (we do not punish children for parents' crimes),12 perhaps there is
more to recommend it in the corporate context. Should criminal liability not stick
firmly to corporations and their successors to ensure that corporate crime gets
punished?'3 Even if this means that courts will sometimes punish seemingly
innocent corporate successors, is this really problematic where such fictional
people are concerned?
The current state of successor liability should worry everyone from law and
economics scholars to justice theorists. In a world where the annual social costs
of white-collar crime often exceed half a trillion dollars 4 and prosecutors
regularly resolve corporate investigations for penalties exceeding one hundred
million dollars,15 the stakes of getting corporate liability right are high. By
automatically transmitting any criminal liability from predecessors to
successors, current doctrine fails to distinguish between ways corporations can
reorganize.
immediately self-reported the suspected violations of the target company, it is still currently legally
susceptible to criminal prosecution and severe penalties.") (footnotes omitted).
10. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) ("[T]he words 'person' and 'whoever' include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.").
11. Successor Liability, PRACTICAL LAW GLOSSARY (2017).
12. See also Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1875) (holding that
forfeiture of property as punishment for a Civil War Confederate's treason did not extend to the
Confederate's children who retained a future interest in the property).
13. This Article focuses only on the punitive aspects of criminal punishment. Payments
that repair harm, such as restitution, are also widely available in criminal law, see, e.g., Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (2018), but require a different approach. Similarly, the Article
develops a theory of corporate identity for criminal law only. A different theory of corporate identity will
be appropriate in other contexts, such as civil law, where the goals are not the same as in criminal law.
14. See RODNEY HUFF, CHRISTIAN DESILETS & JOHN KANE, THE 2010 NATIONAL
PUBLIC SURVEY ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 12 (2010), http://www.fraudaid.com/library/2010-national-
public-survey-on-white-collar-crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDD5-SEEB].
15. For the last decade or so, prosecutors have resolved (whether by plea or prosecution
agreement) an average of ten criminal investigations a year against corporations with penalties exceeding
over $100,000,000. In the last five years, at least one of those each year has been resolved for
$1,000,000,000. These results come from an analysis of data available on Brandon Garrett's Corporate
Prosecution Registry. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry, DUKE U. &
U. VA. SCH. L., http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/index.html
[https://perma.cc/BWU7-EZUB]. When related "civil" penalties are accounted for too, these numbers




Reorganizations can differ widely. Corporations know this. It is no secret
that they try to use their fluid form and the potentialities of reorganization to
manage their liabilities, both criminal and civil.' 6 Law influences the choices
corporations make during reorganization, and these choices can have important
implications for criminal justice policy. One crucial lever of influence is how
reorganization impacts corporate criminal liability. That lever is currently stuck
in "transmit."
Some reorganizations are socially preferable, and the law should
incentivize them. More specifically, current law fails to recognize that corporate
reorganizations are pivotal moments when corporations could be encouraged to
make significant improvements to compliance. By ignoring the details of each
reorganization, current doctrine also cannot distinguish between cases when
punishing successor corporations would advance social goals, and when not.
Though corporations may be fictional people, they are composed of largely
innocent real people shareholders, employees, etc. who bear the burdens of
corporate sanctions: "When the corporation catches a cold, someone else
sneezes."'17 The criminal law must balance considerations of social policy and
justice where corporations are concerned because punishing them effectively
sanctions their constituents.
Puzzlingly, scholars have paid little attention to successor criminal liability.
One goal of this Article is to change that, and to start a conversation about how
successor liability affects the policy and justice goals of corporate criminal law.
It will also offer a proposal for improving current law, a more fine-grained
approach to successor liability that better calibrates corporate incentives and
responds to considerations of justice. Rather than automatically transmitting
liability from predecessors to successors, the proposed replacement asks first
whether the successor shares a "criminal identity" with any of its predecessors.
Drawing on themes from the science and theory of identity, the Article will
define a corporation's criminal identity to be whatever organizational defect(s)
caused or enabled its criminal conduct. Ensuring that courts only punish
successors who inherit their predecessors' criminal identity would be a positive
development in light of criminal law's basic purposes: rehabilitation, deterrence,
and retribution. By giving corporations strong incentives to reform themselves
during reorganization, the successor identity approach better satisfies criminal
law's project of rehabilitating criminal corporations. Since these reforms raise
the chance that any employee misconduct will be uncovered, the proposal stands
a better chance of deterring corporate crime at its individual sources. Lastly, only
by considering corporate identity can the criminal law ensure that corporate
criminals, and not different innocent corporations, receive their just deserts.
16. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Spinoffs, a Chance to Jettison Liabilities, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/12/in-spinoffs-a-chance-to-jettison-
undesirable-liabilities [https:Hperma.cc/WZY9-4ZYY].
17. John C. Coffee, "'No Soul to Damn; No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981).
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After some preliminary caveats and stage-setting (Part II), the Article lays
out the current law of successor criminal liability (Part III). Courts uncritically
imported this doctrine from civil law. While the doctrine may have served
admirably in that context, the Article argues that it is poorly adapted to the
purposes of corporate criminal law. The law would be better served by tying
successor liability to successor identity and by extinguishing criminal liability
when reorganization fixes the organizational defects of criminal predecessors
(Part IV). Implementing successor identity as a framework for tracing corporate
liability through reorganization requires attention to several practicalities and
refinements. The Article addresses these (Part V) and concludes by considering
the broader implications of identity for corporate criminal aw (Part VI).
II. Preliminaries
Scholarship on corporate criminal law is fraught with conflicting agendas
and perspectives that can derail a discussion before it starts. People disagree not
only about whether the law should focus on deterring corporate crime or giving
corporations their just deserts, but also about whether criminal law has any
coherent role to play in regulating corporate affairs at all. A few initial
clarifications will frame the project and avoid some possible confusions later on.
A. The Purposes of Corporate Criminal Law
While the law responds to corporate misconduct in many ways, this Article
solely concentrates on punitive responses. "Successor liability" refers to
overlapping doctrines in both criminal and civil law.'8 These two domains have
different purposes,19 and considerations appropriate o one will not necessarily
translate to the other. For example, justice and deterrence are central to criminal
law,20 while civil law tends to focus on matters of social efficiency,2' like optimal
18. See CRIMINAL Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & ENF'T Div., U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 28 (2012)
[hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE], https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/515229-a-resource-
guide-to-the-u-s-foreign-corrupt.html [http://perma.cc/NZ2E-CYZE] ("Successor liability applies to all
kinds of civil and criminal liabilities.").
19. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2442, 2444 (1995)
("Notwithstanding [a] modern blurring of civil and criminal law, criminal law retains certain
distinguishing features. The most significant is its sanction, from which most of criminal law's other
features flow .... [C]riminal law is more appropriate for redressing violations of absolute duties, whereas
tort law is better suited for redressing violations of relative duties.").
20. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation
of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950, 983 (2003) (explaining
that deterrence has been a centerpiece of modern criminal law reform and discussing its relationship to
another a central concern of criminal law: justice).
21. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, Negligence - Economic Efficiency: Doubts, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 1605, 1605-06 (1997) ("The Restatement (Second) of Torts... provid[es] a risk-benefit test for
unreasonable conduct and negligence."). But see Jules Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 423 (1982) ("[T]he considerations that ground a claim to recompense need not
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risk allocation2 2 or efficient breach.23 Admittedly, things are complicated by the
fact that the civil/criminal divide is frequently blurred.24 Some criminal
sanctions, like restitution,25  perform civil-style functions like cost
internalization26 and making victims whole.2  And some civil remedies, like
punitive damages, seem to encroach on criminal law's core concerns.28 This
Article is exclusively about successor criminal liability for core punitive
sanctions, like fines. It does not address civil liability or liability for non-punitive
criminal sanctions, like restitution. The considerations that this Article raises in
coincide with those that ground the obligation to repair."); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence ofContract
and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1648 (2009) ("I have outlined a personal sovereignty theory of
the foundation of promissory morality and argued that it largely reconciles contract and promise. It
explains why contract law's failure to enforce some promises is consistent with the demands of promissory
morality, and why most of the doctrines alleged to diverge from promissory morality in fact correspond
to it .... [M]any of contract law's remedial default rules can be understood as enforcing the corresponding
remedial moral rights and duties to which breach of promise gives rise.").
22. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) ("[T]he
owner's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three
variables: (1) The probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does;
(3) the burden of adequate precautions.").
23. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory of
Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 977 (2005).
24. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "'Unlawful" Mean "'Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 193 (1991) ("[T]he
dominant development in substantive federal criminal law over the last decade has been the disappearance
of any clearly definable line between civil and criminal law.").
25. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) (
2 0 18
) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order, in
addition to, or in the case of a misdemeanor, in addition to or in lieu of, any other penalty authorized by
law, that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the
victim's estate.").
26. PAUL ROSENZWEIG, HERITAGE FOUND., THE OVER-CRIMINALIZATION OF SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONDUCT (2003), https://www.heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/the-over-
criminalization-social-and-economic-conduct [https://perma.ccV8TL-5CP6] ("[Tort law and civil
enforcement] systems have been thought, in the past, to suffice in requiring economic actors
to internalize the costs of their conduct and avoid imposing those same costs on unwitting external actors.
Now, however, the criminal law is being used in an avowedly instrumental capacity.").
27. Todd R. Clear, Editorial Introduction, Restorative Justice, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y. 101, 101 (2005) ("Restorative justice is a new movement contained within an old idea .... [It] is
a worldwide panoply of new programs, initiatives, and special projects aimed to restore victims by having
those who wronged them repair the harm. The swiftness with which restorative justice and related
strategies have captured the imagination of justice system reformers is striking .... Today, concepts
associated with restorative justice principles community participation, victim-offender interaction,
reparative sanctions, and so forth are a firm part of mainstream justice system priorities.").
28. Robert H. Maar, The Punitive Damages Heresy, 2 SOUTHERN L.Q. 1, 1-2 (1917)
("All that any plaintiff has a right to recover is what is justly due him. He is entitled to be made whole,
but to nothing more. The proponents of the exemplary damages theory admit this, but they say, that after
the plaintiff has been awarded such damages as compensate him, an additional sum may be awarded
against the defendant as punitory damages, to punish him for the wrong he has done, or as exemplary
damages, to deter others from the commission of a like wrong. If any damages at all, by way of punishment
or example, could be assessed against a defendant, such damages could not belong to a plaintiff who has
already been awarded compensation. Things are what they are, not what they may happen to be called: a
fine is the sum of money assessed against a defendant for the wrong he has done, and it is none the less a
fine because assessed in a civil suit and called 'punitory damages.' The proceeds of fines belong to the
State, and are wholly under legislative control.").
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favor of limiting successor criminal liability will often not apply where these
other sanctions or remedies are concerned.2 9
There is no universal consensus about when it is appropriate to punish
corporations. Perspectives vary according to the purposes of corporate criminal
law they emphasize. Generally acknowledged purposes include "provid[ing] just
punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to maintain
internal [compliance and reporting] mechanisms.30 Scholars and policy makers
often prefer some single purpose over others. 31 Some think just punishment is
nonsensical for corporations32 and evaluate corporate punishment solely in terms
of deterrence.33 Others think justice and retribution need to play a larger, even
decisive, role.34
This Article will remain neutral on such foundational questions. It will
provide separate arguments for each basic purpose of corporate criminal law.
The arguments all point to the same conclusion the current doctrine of
successor liability is problematic, and an approach that emphasizes criminal
identity would be a significant improvement regardless of which purpose one
prefers. The order of the arguments is unimportant, and readers should feel free
to skip to those that resonate with their favored perspective.
29. Thanks to Professor Robert Miller for pushing me to finesse this point. As he
pointed out to me, for example, I would not want to say that a successor who does not inherit its
predecessor's criminal identity is therefore not identical to its predecessor for contract law purposes. This
may seem like saying the successor both is and is not identical to its predecessor. But talking about identity
relative to a context like identity for purposes of criminal law as distinct from identity for purposes of
contract law rather than identity simpliciter should help smooth out this wrinkle.
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES]; MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a)
(Am. Law Inst. 2017) (referring to all three purposes).
31. Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Causes of Corporate Crime: An
Economic Perspective, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE
CORPORATE CONDUCT 11, 11 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (deterrence); Kyron
Huigens, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and Theories of Punishment: A Response to Brown, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1, 5 (2002) (rehabilitation); Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987) (retribution). For a
more pluralistic approach to the purposes of criminal law, see Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism,
in RETRIBUTIVISM: ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25 (Mark D. White ed., 2011).
32. See Kip Schlegel, Desert, Retribution, and Corporate Criminality, 5 JUST. Q. 615,
615 (1988) ("To the extent that desert has been considered it generally has been dismissed either as
inappropriate or as unfeasible in the context of corporate criminality .... First, retributive principles,
among which desert is included, are not applicable as justifications for corporate criminal sanctions
because concepts such as vengeance and restoring benefits and burdens make little sense in the realm of
corporate activity. Second, desert, which focuses on the importance of blame, seems inapplicable to
regulatory offenses, which are not considered morally wrong.") (citations omitted).
33. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1325 (2001) ("Corporate criminal law ... operates firmly in a
deterrence mode.").
34. William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants
of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2000) ("We maintain an allegiance to the
foundation of the general part of the criminal law, requiring evidence of moral fault in the offending
person, whether biological or corporate. By conceiving of the corporation as a moral actor, we challenge
the work of those who see the corporate person as 'soulless,' and the only or primary objective of the
corporate criminal law as deterrence.").
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There is one point of view this Article will not attempt to engage. Some
scholars advocate scrapping corporate criminal law entirely,35 and presumably
the law of successor criminal liability along with it. They may be right; perhaps,
building from a clean slate, the ideal system of corporate liability would rely
exclusively on social, civil, and administrative sanctions.36 This Article's
ambitions are more modest: to improve the law by working, so far as possible,
within its present framework. In the current political climate, anything more
drastic is probably fanciful anyway voters want to see corporations held
criminally accountable.3
B. The Identity Principle
The reason that successor liability has so far escaped the analytic crosshairs
of corporate crime scholars may not be very deep; it may just be an accident of
language. There are two meanings of "successor corporation." It can refer to a
corporation that emerges from a corporate reorganization.38 It can also refer to
whatever corporation inherits the rights and duties of some earlier corporation.39
In common legal understanding, these two definitions are merged, so that a
successor becomes: "A corporation that, through amalgamation, consolidation,
or other assumption of interests, is vested with the rights and duties of an earlier
corporation."4 But it is possible to pull the two meanings apart successors in
the first sense need not be successors in the second sense as well. Taking
advantage of that space between the meanings would require achange in law and
a new concept for transferring liability through reorganization.
To open conceptual space and to distance itself from current doctrines of
successor liability, the Article frames its argument in terms of what it calls
"successor identity." This is not just a verbal maneuver. Identity plays a central
role throughout criminal law. For individual defendants, identity plays the same
35. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
319, 319 (1996) ("We argue that there is no need for corporate criminal liability in a legal system with
appropriate civil remedies ...."); John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of
Corporate CriminalLiahility, 1330 AM. CRIM. L REV. 1329, 1329 (2009) ("[Corporate criminal liability]
should be explicitly overruled.").
36. I am skeptical, though. I think corporate criminal aw plays an important expressive
role that other liability regimes cannot. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2049, 2063-64 (2016).
37. See Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U.L. REV. 577, 612 (2012) ("The
public has increasingly registered greater moral outrage in response to corporate governance scandals.
Moral outrage, in turn, fuels retributive motivations and therefore supports those institutions best poised
to take advantage of such motivations.").
38. See, e.g., Centra, Inc. v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Area Pension Fund 578 F.3d 592,
599 (7th Cir. 2009) ("Following such reorganizations, the successor corporation 'or corporations' are
deemed the 'original employer' for purposes of determining withdrawal liability, and withdrawal liability
is not incurred until such time (if any) as the successor withdraws from the plan.").
39. See, e.g., Emhart Indus. v. Home Ins. Co., 515 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D.R.I. 2007)
("[A] successor corporation i herits the rights and benefits of a predecessor corporation's 'occurrence'
policies.").
40. Successor, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (I10th ed. 2014).
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functional role that successorship lays for reorganized corporations; it helps to
trace liability for past crimes to present-day people. Courts should punish the
individual defendant today only if she shares the identity of the person who
committed the crime in the past. This so-called "identity principle" is a basic
tenet of criminal justice41 and due process42 that usually stands without
mention.43 However, in corporate criminal law, automatic successor liability
bypasses the identity principle.
Shifting perspectives to think of corporate liability in terms of identity
rather than formal successorship would generate different outcomes
sometimes the identity relation will fail, and successors will not be identical to
predecessors. Corporations can, over time, change everything about
themselves who owns them, who manages them, where they are
headquartered, what business they do, what they are called, etc. At some point,
it becomes implausible to say that a corporation bearing no resemblance to its
former self nonetheless has one continuous identity. In those cases, contrary to
current doctrine, the identity principle would require absolving successors of
their predecessors' crimes. The identity principle would allow corporate criminal
law to make more fine-grained istinctions between different reorganizations;
the law today treats all the same.
On the approach this Article develops, everything will turn on whether, for
purposes of criminal law, a successor shares a criminal identity with its
predecessors. For individual defendants, the analogous question is easy. There
are many markers that reliably track individual identity from birth to death, such
as DNA, fingerprints, facial structure, and social security numbers. For successor
and predecessor corporations, whose composition and structure are much more
fluid, the question becomes complex. Nothing about a corporation-its
ownership, management, employee base, name, line of business, internal
structure, geographic location, etc. is set in stone.
41. JOSEPH BUTLER, 0fPersonal Identity, in THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION 439 (3d ed.
1740); JOHN LOCKE, OfIdentity and Diversity, in AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 133
(Kenneth P. Winkler ed., Hackett Publ'g 1996) (1689); THOMAS REID, Essays on the Intellectual Powers
of Man: Of Memory, in ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN 206 (Ronald E. Beanblossom &
Keith Lehrer eds., Hackett Publ'g 2011) (1785); Derek Parfit, supra note 6, at 3-5 (1971).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; id. amend. V.
43. There are some doctrines of criminal law that permit the transfer of liability from
one criminal, A, to another, B. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1246-47 (2014) (discussing
aiding and abetting liability); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,641 (1946) (discussing conspiracy
liability). Even though B may not have directly carried out the criminal conduct, these doctrines are
premised on the criminal involvement of B in the commission of A's crimes. See, e.g., Rosemond, 134 S.
Ct. at 1246-47; Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644. It would, however, violate the identity principle and Due
Process to punish a third person, C, who had no criminal involvement. See Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal
Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 638-39 (2008) ("It is
almost certain that the Due Process Clause would forbid sending A to prison for B's crimes based entirely
on the fact that A and B are cousins.").
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The issue of corporate identity is new territory in corporate law and
theory.44 Just as there are different perspectives about the purposes of corporate
criminal law, so there will be different perspectives about what counts as a good
theory of corporate criminal identity. Most people, at least among legal scholars,
think that corporate personhood is just a useful fiction.4 5 They should be willing
to entertain a broader range of proposals on corporate identity, but these scholars
will settle on whichever doctrine best promotes the goals of the fiction. There
are some other scholars, usually philosophers of collective responsibility, who
think corporations really do have moral personalities, and, presumably,
identities.46 These scholars will want to be persuaded that any proposal about
corporate identity truly tracks the continuity of moral personhood from
predecessors to successors. Once again, this Article bridges the methodological
divide by offering a one-size-fits-all answer. Though t e arguments that follow
necessarily differ for each perspective, they all support the doctrine of successor
identity.4
C. Corporate Reform in Criminal Law
It bears briefly noting that this Article continues previous work about the
role criminal law can and should play in reforming corporations. My article,
Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate Punishment, argued
that corporate punishment should involve coercive and invasive reform of
convicted corporations, to the exclusion of all other sanctions.48 Few would
disagree that the criminal law should take an interest in reforming criminal
dispositions. The unique characteristics of corporate defendants ameliorate the
practical (is it possible?)49 and ethical (does it violate dignity?)50 concerns some
44. The most relevant prior work I have found on the issue is CAROL ROVANE, THE
BOUNDS OF AGENCY 136-208 (1998).
45. See, e.g., John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE L.J. 655, 655-73 (1926) (discussing the long tradition of fictitious legal personhood); William
S. Laufer, Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds, 43 EMORY L.J. 647, 650 (1994) (indicating that the fiction
of corporate personhood in criminal law has been uncritically received).
46. See, e.g., Philip Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171, 171 (2007)
(asserting that responsibility should be liberally attributed to collective groups in the corporate context).
47. The article develops a theory of corporate identity for criminal law only. A different
theory of corporate identity may be appropriate in other contexts, such as civil law, where the goals are
not the same as in criminal law.
48. Mihailis E. Diamantis, Clockwork Corporations: A Character Theory of Corporate
Punishment, 102 IOWAL. REV. 507 (2018).
49. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 11 14a (David Ross trans., 2009) ("So, too,
to the unjust and to the self-indulgent man it was open at the beginning not to become men of this kind
... but now that they have become so it is not possible for them not to be so."); Russ Shafer-Landau, Can
Punishment Morally Educate?, 10 L. & PHIL. 189, 200 (1991) ("It remains unlikely that being put behind
bars ... will bring about moral change [in individual criminals].").
50. See ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962); Huigens, supra note 31,
at 18 ("Regardless of how one explains just punishment, it treats the offender with respect because it
necessarily supposes that he is a responsible being. The treatment of pathology, in contrast, supposes the
patient to be irresponsible and adopts an inherently paternalistic stance toward him."); Herbert Morris, A
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scholars have about coercive reform where individual criminal defendants are
concerned.5 ' This Article builds on the observation that corporations'
malleability presents opportunities for fostering reform that the law cannot have
with individuals. The theory of successor identity offered below capitalizes on
those opportunities.
III. Shortcomings of Successor Liability
This Part clears the way for a new approach to holding successors liable for
predecessor crime. It presents an overview of the current law of successor
liability and shows how poorly equipped it is to satisfy the basic purposes of
corporate criminal law.
A. Existing Successor Liability Doctrine
Few criminal law scholars have had much to say about successor liability.
For each type of reorganization, the doctrine says which of the predecessors'
criminal liabilities survive. If corporations A and B merge or consolidate to form
C, the doctrine says whether C has the liabilities of A or B, neither, or both. If
corporation X splits into Y and Z (perhaps by spinning off Z), the doctrine says
whether Y or Z inherits the liabilities of X, or whether neither does or both do.
Commentators reflecting on the law of successor liability have called it a
"doctrinal morass [with a] high degree of uncertainty.'52 But, with some effort,
a simple pattern emerges: the criminal liabilities of predecessors survive
reorganization, and all successors inherit the criminal taint. In other words, C has
the liabilities of both A and B, and Y and Z both have the liabilities of X.
53
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 265 (1981) ("[Morris's theory rejects] any
response that sought the good of a wrongdoer in a manner that bypassed the human capacity for reflection,
understanding, and revision of attitude that may result from such efforts.").
51. See AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 149 (2015) ("[T]he rights of a corporation cannot be included within the
[Constitutional] framework of human dignity. Corporations have no humanity."); DAVID H. GANS & ILYA
SHAPIRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES FOR CORPORATIONS?: HOBBY LOBBY, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2014) ("[W]hen the Supreme Court has interpreted other fundamental,
personal rights of human dignity and conscience, it has consistently held that those protections do not
extend to corporations. Thus, while business corporations have a number of rights under the Constitution,
there are some particularly ones that protect human dignity that they don't possess."); Samuel W. Buell,
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM, supra note 31,
at 87, 105 ("It might be true in the context of individual punishment that, with rehabilitation, 'nothing works.'
But we have not yet learned that to be true for corporations.").
52. Henry Hansmarm & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1885 n.15 (1991); see also H. Lowell Brown, Successor
Corporate Criminal Liability: The Emerging Federal Common Law, 49 ARK. L. REV. 469, 470 (1996)
("[W]hen the predecessor corporation has not been formally charged prior to dissolution, the
transmutation of liability to the successor corporation follows a much less established path and becomes
a question of whether the criminal liability abated upon dissolution of the predecessor corporation.").
53. The discussion that follows focuses on binding legal authorities, but non-binding
authorities also illustrate the point that criminal liability survives reorganization. Commentary to the
Sentencing Guidelines tells judges how to determine whether a present-day criminal corporation
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Many things can happen during a reorganization. The law is clear that
internal changes such as changes in ownership, turnover in management, or
compliance reform never affect the transmission of criminal liability. The
reasons are slightly different for each kind of change. The doctrine of
separateness, a cornerstone of corporate law, ensures that corporations have a
separate legal personality from their owners.54 As a result, the identity of a
corporation's owners ordinarily has no bearing on its liability. Similarly, under
respondeat superior, liability for criminal conduct attaches to criminal employees
and separately to their corporate employers; there are no exceptions in the
doctrine for the misconduct of former employees.5 And the fact that corporate
criminal liability persists even after implementing programs of internal
compliance is so axiomatic that none have questioned it. The most criminal
corporations can hope for by boosting compliance or firing wayward employees
is the uncertain exercise of a prosecutor's favorable charging discretion.56
The doctrine of successor criminal liability in merger and spin-off cases is
a bit more difficult to tease out, but the final result is the same criminal liability
sticks around and taints all successors. When a reorganization involves the
dissolution of a corporate predecessor or the creation of a new composite
corporate successor (as in consolidations and mergers), the core doctrines of
committed other past criminal acts: "in determining the prior [criminal] history of an organization or
separately managed line of business, the conduct of the underlying economic entity shall be considered
without regard to its legal structure or ownership." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 8C2.5 cmt.
n.6. Prosecutors have been known to include provisions in deferred prosecution agreements affirming
that, "in the event [the corporation] sells, merges, or transfers.., its business operations.., it shall include
in any contract for sale, merger, or transfer a provision binding the purchaser, or any successor in interest
thereto, to the obligations described in this Agreement." Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 12, United
States v. Total, S.A., No. 1:13 CR 239 (E.D. Va. 2013). See also SHERMAN & STERLING, LLP, WHAT
You DON'T KNOW CAN HURT You: SUCCESSOR LIABILITY RESULTING FROM INADEQUATE FCPA DUE




[https://perma.cc/LN8Y-5QTK] ("As a legal matter, when one corporation acquires another, it assumes
any existing liabilities of that corporation, including [criminal] liability for unlawful payments, regardless
of whether it knows of them.").
54. See Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410, 415 (1932) ("A corporation and its stockholders
are generally to be treated as separate entities"); Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1896] UKHL 1, [1897]
AC 22; Philip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 283, 287 (1990) ("[T]he corporation is conceptualized as a separate legal right-and-duty-bearing
unit."); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 815 (2017) ("A change in ownership and control of a corporate defendant
does not preclude corporate criminal liability for offenses committed prior to that change.").
55. Hiroko Tabuchi et al., Six Volkswagen Executives Charged as Company Pleads
Guilty in Emissions Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11 /business/volkswagen-diesel-vw-settlement-charges-criminal.html
[http://perma.cc/C7SX-RQNA] (explaining that company was prosecuted based on acts of former
officers).
56. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) (directing prosecutors to consider "the corporation's remedial actions,
including any efforts ... to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers").
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successor liability come into play.5 Courts must determine whether the liability
of the dissolved corporation somehow survives and whether the newly created
corporation inherits it. Originally, U.S. courts had adopted a formalistic
approach. Criminal liability was tied to the corporate form to which it originally
attached. Inspired by an analogy between corporate dissolution and the death of
natural people, courts used to hold that dissolution of that corporate form
extinguished criminal liability.58
Courts and legislatures have since imported very different doctrines of
successor liability from civil law59 into criminal law.60 Today, dissolution,
merger, and consolidation do not eliminate criminal liability. 61 Federal courts
have yet to develop a federal common law of successor liability.62 They turn
instead to state law, which they read "liberally to permit criminal prosecutions
after the corporation has been dissolved.63 This reading accords well with state
practice. The Model Business Corporations Act, drafted by the American Bar
Association and followed by twenty-four states,64 recommends that "all debts,
obligations and other liabilities of each domestic or foreign corporation or
eligible entity that is a party to the merger, other than the survivor, are debts,
obligations or liabilities of the survivor. '65 The Delaware Code's version of this
57. Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., L.L.C., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2013)
("[S]uccessor liability presumes that the predecessor entity is absorbed into the success or and ceases to
exist as a viable or functional business."); ELLEN S. PODGOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME 42 (2013)
("Whether via dissolution, bankruptcy, mergers, or sales, the original corporation may no longer be
present and it may be necessary to determine whether the criminal matter can proceed.").
58. Okla. Nat. Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927) ("It is well settled that
at common law and in the federal jurisdiction a corporation which has been dissolved is as if it did not
exist, and the result of the dissolution cannot be distinguished from the death of a natural person in its
effect.").
59. H. Lowell Brown, Successor Corporate Criminal Liability: The Emerging Federal
Common Law, 49 ARK. L. REV. 469, 469-70 (1996) ("In many instances, state laws intended to protect
civil creditors and claimants have been borrowed wholesale and engrafted onto the criminal law to form
a patchwork that is both perplexing and perilous.").
60. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 272 (1959) ("[P]rosecutions
abate ... on the dissolution of a corporate defendant ... unless the action is saved by statute.").
61. United States v. Alamo Bank of Tex., 880 F.2d 828, 830 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that a corporation "cannot escape punishment by merging with [another corporation] and taking [its
corporate] persona").
62. Taylor J. Phillips, The Federal Common Law of Successor Liability and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 6 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 89, 130 (2015) ("[N]o federal court has ever analyzed
criminal [successor liability].").
63. ELLEN POGDOR ET AL., WHITE COLLAR CRIME 43 (2013); see also Melrose
Distillers, 359 U.S. at 271 (holding that, depending on state law, a corporation that is dissolved can still
be subject to criminal liability); United States v. Arcos Corp., 234 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1964) ("A key
to finding criminal liability of a dissolved corporation often lies with the existence of a state statute that
permits extending the criminal liability beyond the life of the entity. This is because corporations are
created and dissolved pursuant to state law and therefore state law may control the legal obligations of the
entity."); Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Principles of Corporate Criminal Liability, in 1 BNA/ACCA COMPL.
MAN.: PREVENTION OF CORP. LIAB. (BNA) 2:1, 2:19 (1993) ("[C]ourts have displayed considerable
dexterity ... to bless prosecutorial actions against corporate successors.").
64. Lucian Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 844
(2014).
65. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.07 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2016).
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provision provides that in the case of a merger, "all rights of creditors
and ... liabilities and duties of the respective constituent corporations shall
thenceforth attach to said surviving or resulting corporation, and may be
enforced against i to the same extent as if said debts, liabilities and duties had
been incurred or contracted by it."' 6 6 As a result, criminal liability survives
merger or consolidation and attaches to the resulting corporate successor.67 So
strong is this rule that in some jurisdictions68 it forms a narrow exception to the
long-standing corporate dogma that liabilities do not follow assets in a sale.69 In
these jurisdictions, where a transaction structured as a sale amounts to a de facto
merger7° or a continuation of the prior business,71 the purchasing corporation
inherits the criminal liabilities of the transferring corporation. 2
With respect to spin-offs, the law of successor liability is a little less clear.
For civil liabilities, the spin-off agreement governs whether the parent company,
or the spin-off, takes the liabilities, with the presumption being that the liabilities
follow the lines of business in which they arose .7' But it is doubtful that courts
would adopt this model directly in the criminal context. Doing so would allow
66. 8 Del. Laws § 259 (2018).
67. United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974) (interpreting New York law
as stating that a corporation resulting from a merger is liable for the crimes of its predecessor); Brown,
supra note 52, at 481 (citing many cases).
68. Only a minority of jurisdictions accept the rule. See, e.g., Farris v. Glen Alden
Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958). Very significantly, Delaware courts reject the doctrine, see Hariton v. Arco
Electronics, Inc., 182 A.2d 22 (Del. Ch. 1962), a/'d, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963), unless a corporation is
playing fast and loose with the asset sale statutes. See Orzeck v. Englehart, 195 A.2d 375, 378 (Del. 1963).
69. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) ("When no statutory merger or consolidation occurs, but one
corporations buys all of the assets of another, the successor will not be saddled with the seller's liability
except under certain conditions."); Jerry J. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 908 (1983) ("In general, corporate law does not
impose successor liability in a sale of assets transaction.").
70. Arnold Graphics Indus., Inc. v. Independent Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38, 42 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("A de facto merger occurs where one corporation is absorbed by another, but without
compliance with the statutory requirements for a merger") (emphasis and citation omitted); Lumbard v.
Maglia, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1529, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("For a de facto merger to occur, there must be
continuity of the successor and predecessor corporation as evidenced by (1) continuity of ownership; (2)
a cessation of ordinary business and dissolution of the predecessor as soon as practically and legally
possible; (3) assumption by the successor of the liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted
continuation of the business of the predecessor; and (4) a continuity of management, personnel, physical
location, assets, and general business operation."). It bears noting that Delaware no longer recognizes the
de facto merger doctrine. Hariton, 188 A.2d 123 (1963).
71. Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198 (D. Wis. 1979) ("The
mere fact that the purchaser continues the operations of the seller does not of itself render the purchaser
liable for the obligations of the seller; in order to impose liability on the purchaser, it must be shown that
the purchaser represents merely a new hat for the seller.") (quoting McKee v. Harris-Seybold Col, 264
A.2d 98, 106 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1970).
72. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. John Heenan, Graceful Maneuvering: Corporate Avoidance of Liability Through
Bankruptcy and Corporate Law, 65 MONT. L. REV. 99, 115-120 (2004). Phillips, supra note 69
(discussing the product line doctrine); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of Enterprise Doctrine:
Corporate Successorship n United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT'L. L. 365,373-75 (1996) (same); Roe, supra
note 8, at 5 ("A firm might reduce the risks associated with a particular product by spinning off to its
shareholders the subsidiary that handles the risky product.").
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private fiat to govern the attachment of criminal liability and would open the
door to some obvious gamesmanship. As a general rule, even in civil law, the
parent must have the agreement of any third party to whom a liability is owed
before the parent can assign the liability to the spin-off." In the criminal context,
the third party with standing to pursue the liability is the government, and federal
prosecutors rarely if ever agree to such assignments of criminal liability. 7' The
likely legal result is that the parent and the spin-off remain liable for any crimes
committed before the separation. In consequence, prosecutors could opt to go
after the parent or the spin-off, or perhaps both. There is some statutory precedent
for this result, for example, when it comes to environmental crimes. 6
B. Successor Liability and the Purposes of Criminal Law
Does the current doctrine of successor liability-that the criminal liability
of any predecessor invariably taints all successors77  make sense for criminal
law?78 The natural reference points for evaluating the question are the various
purposes of corporate criminal law deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.
At first glance, there is good reason for skepticism. Because the current law of
successor liability always holds successors liable for predecessor crime, it cannot
distinguish between reorganizations that promote th interests of criminal justice
and those that do not. Detailed arguments from within each perspective on
criminal justice confirm this first impression.
74. STEPHEN M. KOTRAN ET AL., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, SPIN-OFFS 36 (2010),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/September2010 SpinOffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/PAB7-
ENSX].
75. 1 am aware of no examples.
76. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) ("No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be
effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be
liable for a release or threat of release under this section, to any other person the liability imposed under
this section.").
77. At least one scholar would push back on the narrow issue of whether successor
liability applies to successors by way of asset sales in the context of the FCPA. See Taylor J. Phillips, The
Federal Common Law of Successor Liability and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 6 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REV. 89 (2015). The DOJ historically has disagreed. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 18,
at 28. It may be shifting course. Nicholas Bourtin et al., Deputy Assistant Attorney General Matthew
Miner Announces that FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy Will Apply to Mergers and Acquisitions,
PCCE (July 31, 2018), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance enforcement/2018/07/31/deputy-assistant-
attomrney-general-matthew-miner-announces-that-fcpa-corporate-enforcement-policy-will-appy-to-
mergers-and-acquisitions [https://perma.cc/R8K8-9PP9].
78. Professor Miriam Baer has forcefully pressed the point in personal correspondence
that this is not quite the right question to ask. Prosecutors stand between doctrine and corporate suspects,
and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion affects how doctrine shows itself in practice. She is, of course,
right. The better question would ask whether the law of successor liability as-applied makes sense for
criminal law. I have previously expressed my skepticism about relying on prosecutors to round out the
unappealing edges of our corporate criminal aw. See Diamantis, supra note 48, at 559-62. Prosecutors
often lack the relevant expertise to make good policy for corporate crime and can be distracted by
distorting personal incentives. It is my hope that giving them a doctrinal nudge in the right direction would
only increase the chance that the system of criminal justice, in the end, promote its own objectives.
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The prima facie argument for the deterrent effects of successor liability may
seem intuitive enough. By effectively making successor corporations strictly
liable for the crimes of predecessors, current law focuses its influence on the
incentives corporations have for avoiding crime in the first place. Liability for
crime, once it attaches, sticks around until it has been punished or the statute of
limitations runs. Current law forecloses any possibility that predecessors could
commit crimes and then shed their liability through reorganization. This gives
corporations strong incentives to avoid criminal conduct from the beginning,
since liability will follow them through any reorganization. Such an approach
might seem an effective way to prevent corporate crime, which is what
deterrence theorists ultimately want.
However, deterring corporate crime is a more complicated endeavor than
the prima facie argument presupposes. Below the surface, corporations are
composite actors. Corporate crime is often the product of individual employee
misconduct.8" So deterring corporate crime requires deterring individual
employees from committing crime on the corporation's behalf. Employee crime
is a byproduct of the fundamental problem of corporate agency costs. Employees
"have a natural incentive to advance their personal interests even when those
interests conflict with the goal of maximizing firm value."81 By committing
crime, employees can secure private benefits for themselves (in terms of
performance bonuses, reputation, promotion, etc.) even if, on balance, the risk
of sanction to the corporation outweighs any short-term corporate benefits.
82
Ordinarily, employee and employer incentives to avoid crime should be
aligned since criminal employees should be exposed to criminal penalties for
their own misconduct. Many criminal employees, though, are banking on the
corporate form to obfuscate their identity and shield them from detection by
public authorities.83 To capture these individuals, authorities need to rely on
corporations to investigate and report employee misconduct.84  While
reorganization might otherwise be a prime opportunity for corporations to do
79. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
80. See Benjamin Thompson & Andrew Yong, Corporate Criminal Liability, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 489, 491-92 (2012) ("A corporation has no physical existence and can be held vicariously
criminally liable for the acts, omissions, or failures of employees acting as agents.").
81. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory
for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 775 (2017).
82. Studies suggest that corporate crime generally decreases overall corporate value.
See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership,
Hidden Actions, and Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (1999).
83. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All Component
Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/11 /charging-corps.PDF
[https://perma.cc/BSP8-T6YZ].
84. Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 321, 325 (2012) ("[T]he Organizational Guidelines do not provide firms with sufficient
mitigation to ensure that firms face lower expected sanctions if they undertake effective corporate policing
when corporate policing substantially increases the probability that the government can detect and
sanction the wrong.").
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this, as explained in the next paragraphs, the law of successor liability gives
corporations strong disincentives to undergo this process. Investigation and self-
reporting against the background of both respondeat superior and successor
liability is a hazardous prospect for both predecessor and successor
corporations.85 Even if a corporation discovers evidence of misconduct during
reorganization, its economically rational course may be to sweep it under the rug
rather than report it to authorities.86
Deterrence is not the only way to prevent crime. Rehabilitation also has a
role to play. Whatever superficial strength successor liability has where
deterrence is concerned comes at the expense of encouraging rehabilitation. In a
large corporation, it is impossible to keep tabs on what every employee is doing.
Some criminal conduct will fly under the radar of even the most robust
compliance programs.8 7  These undetectable crimes are, by definition,
undeterrable. But once a corporation detects misconduct, it has options about
how to respond. This is where some attention in criminal law to rehabilitation
can do serious work. Encouraging corporations to reform vulnerabilities that
allow criminal misconduct requires incentivizing them to detect, investigate, and
patch them. Accomplishing this would have strong preventive effects, which is
ultimately what rehabilitation theorists of corporate punishment also want.88
The current law of successor liability does not provide very strong
incentives for self-initiated corporate rehabilitation. Investigating and detecting
the criminal misconduct of predecessors is risky under current law because it
might draw the attention of authorities.89 Once criminal liability attaches to a
predecessor, it is unshakeable. That leaves corporations with diminished
incentive to detect and reform; detection increases the prospect of punishment,
and reform does not diminish it.90 This is true both for predecessor corporations
addressing their own misconduct and for successor corporations addressing the
misconduct of their predecessors.
This tradeoff between entity-level deterrence and rehabilitation is
unavoidable. Providing incentives for corporations to reform after crime occurs
necessarily diminishes the incentives they have to avoid crime in the first place.
85. Id. at 324 ("[C]orporate efforts to help the government could hurt the firm by
increasing its probability of being held criminally liable.").
86. Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1361
(2006).
87. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense
to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERs L. REV. 605, 644 (1995) (indicating
that even through compliance programs, corporations cannot have complete control over their employees).
88. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, Ditching Deterrence: Preventing Crime by Reforming
Corporations Rather Than Fining Them, N.Y.U. PROGRAM ON COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 3,
2018), https:Hwp.nyu.edu/compliance enforcement/2018/01/03/ditching-deterrence-preventing-crime-
by-reforming-corporations-rather-than-fining-them [perma.cc/72KR-PVYN].
89. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct, 72 N.Y.U.





Sticking to the ex ante deterrent incentives necessarily undercuts the incentive to
reform after crime occurs. The ultimate arbiter of when the law has struck the
appropriate balance between deterrence and rehabilitation is how well it prevents
corporate crime. This is the common currency acknowledged by both
perspectives. The arguments in Part IV show that a turn to successor identity
would do better because it encourages corporations to reform and does not
penalize them if they identify and report criminal employees in the process.
A very different sort of argument is needed to assess whether successor
liability satisfies the criminal law's retributive purposes. Retributivists care
foremost about giving criminals their just deserts, rather than about preventing
crime. Successor liability is well-positioned to make good on the retributivist
intuition that crime should be punished.91 Since the criminal liability of
predecessors invariably taints successors, there is no legal bar to punishing
successors. Were corporations able to reorganize in ways that would eliminate
criminal liability for past misconduct, they likely would, and some crimes would
go unpunished.
But retribution does not simply call for punishment to follow crime; it must
be punishment of the person who did it. This is the identity principle mentioned
above. Successor liability allows authorities to punish successors vicariously for
predecessor crime, without regard to whether the two share a criminal identity.
Every theory of identity allows for the possibility of change, particularly where
the sorts of radical transformation that corporate reorganizations involve are at
issue.9 2 Assuming corporations are the sorts of things that can have persisting
and changing identities, this presents a problem for successor liability it
necessarily violates the identity principle and the commitments of retributivism
whenever it punishes a successor corporation for the crimes of a predecessor with
which it does not share a criminal identity.93
91. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS § 49 E (Mary Gregor trans., 1991);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) ("The undeserved evil which
anyone commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated on himself"); see Moore, supra note 31, at
179 ("Retributivism is the view that punishment is justified by the moral culpability of those who receive
it.").
92. Cartesian Theory may be a counterexample. According to Cartesians, people are
identical to their indestructible and unchangeable souls. Peter G. H. Clarke, Neuroscience, Quantum
Indeterminism and the Cartesian Soul, 84 BRAIN & COGNITION 109, 110 (2014) (discussing that the
Cartesian soul holds identity separate from the physical body and brain); David Shoemaker, Personal
Identity and Ethics, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry identity-ethics
[http://perma.cc/2LQL-3RMX] ("This is nonreductionism, according to which persons exist separately
and independently from their brains and bodies, and so their lives are unified from birth to death in virtue
of that separately existing entity, what we will call a Cartesian ego (but is most popularly thought of as a
soul)."). In any case, importing some similarly strong and unchangeable concept to the corporate context,
to treat corporations as though they have something like "souls," would require very strong motivation.
93. Current law even goes so far as to punish corporations whose identity has been
extinguished through dissolution. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2004) ("All corporations,
whether they expire by their own limitation or are otherwise dissolved, shall nevertheless be continued,
for the term of 3 years from such expiration or dissolution or for such longer period as the Court of
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To appreciate the weakness of the current law of successor liability,
consider the following scenario. Suppose that, unknown to its executives, an
employee of a small corporation (S) commits a crime within the scope of her
employment. A different, larger corporation (L), also unaware of the crime, sees
some business purpose to acquiring S. L has top-shelf compliance programs,
which it will apply to all of S's operations. In this case, what could possibly be
the purpose behind the law of successor liability which would subject L to the
criminal liabilities of S after acquisition? The ideal outcome, it seems, would be
for L to acquire and then reform S. After the acquisition, there is nothing for
criminal law to do from a rehabilitative perspective. In terms of retribution, it
seems unjust to punish L for S's crimes, especially if S hid or was itself unaware
of its pre-acquisition misconduct. Successor liability even falls short on
deterrence in this example. Punishing L targets the incentives of the wrong
entity L could not have prevented the pre-acquisition misconduct of S.
IV. A New Approach: Successor Identity
Corporate criminal liability is a relatively recent innovation. Its major
developments, like the introduction of respondeat superior a century ago,94
involved uncritically importing principles from civil law.95 Now that experience
has made the implications of that move apparent, few bear any principled love
for the doctrine.9 6 The current law of successor liability will be no different once
it receives the attention it deserves. Its underlying logic may be well-suited to
the remedial civil-law context where it originated.9 Given, however, that the
Chancery shall in its discretion direct, bodies corporate for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
... by or against them."); Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
94. N.Y. Cen. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 485 (1909)
("[There is] no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation... shall be
held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whim it has intrusted authority
to act ....").
95. Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study ofthe Model Penal
Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 28 (1957) ("The law has
developed the concept of corporate criminal liability without rhyme or reason, proceeding by a hit and
miss method, unsupported by economic or sociological data.").
96. See, e.g., Laufer & Strudler, supra note 34, at 1298-99 (2000) ("[V]icarious liability
is an inferior rule for determining corporate responsibility .... Prosecutors also have shied away from
vicarious liability for the very same reasons expressed by courts and legislatures. In addition to
recognizing compliance programs as evidence of due diligence, prosecutorial policies and guidelines
increasingly acknowledge an organizational liability that is separate and apart from an imputed liability
that accompanies vicarious fault."); Geraldine Szott Moohr, OfBad Apples andBad Trees: Considering
Fault-BasedLiability.for the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1359 (2007) ("A second
set of factors that support fault-based criminal liability relate to problematic issues raised by use of the
respondeat superior doctrine.").
97. See Phillips, supra note 62, at 129 ("This absence of criminal successor liability




goals of criminal law are different,98 the prospects for successor liability in that
context were dim from the start.
Criminal law has another device for tracing liability from its origin in the
past to the present-day person to whom it attaches identity. Courts could use
identity, currently limited to the individual context, as a tool for transferring
liability to corporate successors too. Faced with a successor corporation accused
of crimes committed by its predecessor, courts would first ask whether the two
share a criminal identity. Only if they did would the court then transfer the
predecessor's criminal liability to the successor. Stipulate for now that a criminal
corporation's identity is tied to any organizational features that encouraged,
enabled, tolerated, or failed to prevent or detect its criminal conduct.99 The
sections that follow will explain why this makes good policy and conceptual
sense as a theory of identity for corporations.10 0 First, though, it is necessary to
describe how criminal identity (with the stipulated definition) can be
demonstrated and traced for purposes of transferring liability from predecessors
to successors.
A. Organizational Features that Cause Crime
A turn to criminal identity would mark a significant departure from current
law. Recall that, according to current law, the criminal liability of predecessors
is virtually inextinguishable. Regardless of what sort of reorganization the
predecessor might go through, its successors will all inherit its criminal taint. On
the successor identity approach, if the reorganization somehow reforms the
predecessor's criminal identity or otherwise prevents its transfer, the successor
corporation will emerge free of criminal liability.
Carrying out this successor identity approach requires an understanding of
what sorts of organizational features lead corporations to commit crime. It is
these that, if transferred from a criminal predecessor to a successor, would carry
with them the predecessor's liability. Work by business and organizational
scholars suggests which organizational features are more likely, and which less,
to be responsible for misconduct. They have come to distinguish between
98. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
1325, 1325 (1991) (discussing the difference between the guilt/innocence focus of criminal law and the
rights/responsibilities focus of civil law).
99. Using philosopher's terminology, these organizational features are the "essential"
traits for the criminal corporation's identity. Aristotle famously distinguished "accidental" from
"essential" traits, where only a change to the latter would change the identity of the entity possessing the
traits. Gareth B. Matthews, Aristotelian Essentialism, 50 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 251, 251-52
(1990) (discussing Aristotelian Essentialism, the idea that some qualities are essential to a thing, while
others are only accidental).
100. Courts sometimes use the word "identity" when talking about successor liability.
See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 827 F.3d 1026, 1040 (2016) ("[T]he acquired entity in a
merger continues its identity and is an integral part of the successor."). But they use it in a way that is
parasitic on the concepts of successor liability and devoid of independent meaning.
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superficial corporate elements, like external branding symbols,'0 ' and deeper,
causally efficacious traits.'0 2 It is the latter that impact how employees behave
and, as a result, whether corporations commit crimes.
10 3
One of the initial premises of systems theory is that "[o]rganizations are
systems ... not just aggregations of individuals.'0 4 This means that it is often
the corporate organization itself, rather than the individuals within it, that is most
causally effective. Individuals within a corporation adapt to its procedures, rules,
and culture once they join it. 10 5 As a result, "personnel changes will seldom lead
to real changes in the organization's behavior and work processes.'0 6 This is
true throughout the corporate hierarchy.10 7 Wholesale replacement of large
groups of employees may alter causally effective corporate traits, but probably
only because the changeover makes changes in other, more important traits
possible. As a general rule, though, a predecessor's criminal identity will not
attach to specific individuals,108 so a change in personnel during reorganization
will usually not lead the successor to have a new identity. Conversely, if it is the
system rather than particular personnel that matters, continuity in personnel
through reorganization eed not necessarily entail continuity of criminal identity.
101. See, e.g., Andrea Perez & Ignacio Rodriguez del Bosque, The Role of CSR in the
Corporate Identity of Banking Service Providers, 108 J. BUS. ETHICS 145 (2012); Claudia Simoes et al.,
Managing Corporate Identity: An Internal Perspective, 33 J. ACAD. MKTG. SC. 153 (2005); Petra
Theunissen, Co-Creating Corporate Identity Through Dialogue: A Pilot Study, 40 PUB. REL. REV. 612
(2014).
102. J.M.T. Balmer, Corporate Identity and the Advent of Corporate Marketing, 14 J.
MKTG. MGMT. 963 (1998); Olivia Kiriakidou & Lynne J. Millward, 5 CORP. COMMS. 49, 50 (2000)
("[C]orporate identity is more thanjust an organizational symbol or mark of recognition. Rather, corporate
identity denotes the characteristic way in which an organization goes about its business .. "); Cees B.M.
van Reiel & John M.T. Balmer, Corporate Identity: The Concept, Its Measurement and Management, 31
EUR. J. MKTG. 340, 341 (1997) ("Increasingly academics acknowledge that a corporate identity refers to
an organization's unique characteristics which are rooted in the behavior of members of the organization"
rather than such things as "organizational nomenclature, logos, company housestyle and visual
identification.").
103. John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371, 381 (2011)
("[C]orporations should not be able to avoid liability by simply changing their form or name.").
104. J.P. Corneliessen et al., Social Identity, Organizational Identity and Corporate
Identity: Towards an Integrated Understanding of Processes, Patternings and Products, 18 BRIT. J.
MGMT. SI, S8 (2007) ("[C]ollective identities (whether social, organizational or corporate) are ...
associated with behavior that is qualitatively different from that associated with lower-order identities
.... "); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime:
Individualism, Collectivism andAccountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 479 (1988).
105. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 427 (1990).
106. Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability: From
Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 64 BUFFALO CRIM. L.
REV. 641, 688 (2000).
107. M. David Ermann & Richard J. Lundman, Corporate and Governmental
Deviance: Origins, Patterns, andReactions, in CORPORATE AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE: PROBLEMS
OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 115 (M. David Ermann & Richard J.
Lundman eds., 1996).
108. In the rare case where a corporation's misconduct is ultimately traceable to the
influence of a single person, a corporation may effectively shed its criminal identity by firing that person.
In such cases, removal from the corporation and prosecution of that individual alone should be sufficient
to satisfy the interests of criminal justice.
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The same is true of a corporation's shareholders continuity or change in
ownership does not reflect continuity or change in criminal identity.
Shareholders do theoretically have the power to affect the internal operation of
a corporation and to influence whether a corporation has a criminal essence.0 9
But, at least for larger corporations, this power in theory rarely reflects power in
fact. Shareholders are a dispersed group with divergent interests, making
coordination difficult.1 0 Even when coordinated, shareholder power to influence
board decisions or composition is limited,"' their power to influence managers
even more so.112 This is not to deny that shareholders can have an effect on
corporate behavior, especially large institutional shareholders or shareholders of
smaller firms. Even in these cases, though, shareholders are generally not
involved in the day-to-day operation of a corporation and can have little
connection with the causally effective traits that define a criminal corporation's
identity.
If personnel and shareholders are not correlated with criminal identity, what
is? There are some compelling hypotheses available. Corporate culture or ethos
is one supra-individual feature that has attracted the attention of policymakers"
13
and academics in business14 and law.115 The idea here draws on the insight that
organization-level features influence how individuals within a group perform,
including whether they commit crimes.1 6 For example, a high-pressure
environment oriented toward quotas and production goals with little emphasis
on legal or ethical limits can foster malfeasance, even among individuals not
109. Alexander & Cohen, supra note 31, at 11, 18 ("Even if owners may have no direct
contact with criminal behavior, they have rights to intervene in the internal governance of the corporation
in ways that can affect the occurrence of crime.").
110. Lynn Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL.




113. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL 9-28.600 (2018) [hereinafter JUSTICE
MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/j m-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations#9-28.600 [https:Hperma.cc/J7EV-GQTF] ("A corporation, like a natural person, is expected
to learn from its past mistakes. A history of similar misconduct may be probative of a corporate culture
that encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds, regardless of any compliance programs.").
114. Corneliessen et al., supra note 104, at S7 ("Among the most important traits
identified by scholars are those relating to strategy, structure, culture and company history."); see also
T.C. Melewar & E. Karaosmanoglu, Seven Dimensions of Corporate Identity: A Categorization from the
Practitioner's Perspectives, 40 EUR. J. MKTG. 846 (2006).
115. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099-1100 (1991); Brent Fisse, The Attribution of CriminalLiability to
Corporations: A Statutory Model, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 277 (1991); Ann Foerschler, Comment, Corporate
Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding ofCorporate Misconduct, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1300-
02 (1990); Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34 ARIZ. L.
REV. 743, 759-60 (1992).
116. See generally Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational
Crime: Two Models of Criminogenesis, 20 SOC. Q. 517 (1979) (introducing and exploring the concept of
crime-facilitative corporate systems in which participants are not compelled to perform illegal acts, but
rather face extremely tempting structural conditions that encourage or facilitate crime).
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otherwise disposed to it."11 Factors relevant to a corporation's ethos include its
hierarchy, goals and policies, treatment of prior offenses, efforts to educate
employees on compliance with the law, and compensation scheme."8 Workplace
culture is a huge focus in mergers and acquisitions. Many analysts say that
integrating disparate cultures is the number one cause of success or failure when
corporations combine."l9
Another trait that understandably receives a lot of attention is a
corporation's compliance program.120 By definition, compliance programs eek
to prevent misconduct within corporations.121 Compliance programs are related
to, but ultimately different from, corporate ethos. They involve formal
procedures designed to prevent, detect, and remedy criminal conduct within the
corporation. The sorts of techniques currently emphasized in the compliance
literature are mostly commonsense: "promulgation of codes of behavior,
the institution of training programs, the identification of internal compliance
personnel and the creation of procedures and controls to insure company-wide
compliance with legal mandates."2 2 But they need not stop there. Some scholars,
including William Laufer, are calling for a more "progressive," data-driven, and
technically sophisticated approach to compliance.123 We may not know yet
exactly what works and what does not;124 the scientific study of compliance is
117. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Wells Fargo's Pressure-Cooker Sales Culture Comes
at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-
20131222-story.html [https:Hperma.cc/U4N9-8U3D] (discussing how the high-pressure sales
environment of Wells Fargo led to large-scale moral and ethical breaches).
118. Bucy, supra note 115, at 1101.
119. See Christa H. S. Bouwman, The Role of Corporate Culture in Mergers &
Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: PRACTICES, PERFORMANCE AND PERSPECTIVES (Etienne
Perrault ed., 2013),https:Hmba.americaeconomia.com/sites/mba.americaeconomia.com/files/paper 2. df
[https://perma.cc/AYS8-CL43]; George Bradt, The Root Cause Of Every Merger's Success Or Failure:
Culture, FORBES: LEADERSHIP (June 29, 2015, 6:44 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgebradt/2015/06/29/the-root-cause-of-every-mergers-success-or-
failure-culture/#582b7c92d305 [https://perma.cc/B62R-A485]; Dale Stafford & Laura Miles, Integrating
Cultures After a Merger, BAIN & COMPANY: INSIGHTS (Dec. 11, 2013),
http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/integrating-cultures-after-a-merger.aspx
[https://perma.cc/G6T5-MUFW].
120. See Buell, supra note 5131, at 93 ("Criminal [deferred prosecution agreements]
now routinely require firms to reorganize business operations, adopt compliance measures, submit to
enhanced monitoring for legal violations, and create systems to encourage and protect whistle-blowers.").
121. Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949,
956 (2009) ("'Compliance' is a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to deter violations
of law ...."); William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (1999) ("An elaborate cottage industry of ethics compliance and preventive
law experts lay claim to dramatically reducing the likelihood of criminal liability by maintaining an
organizational commitment to ethical standards.").
122. Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings
and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 466-67 (2008).
123. William S. Laufer, The Missing Account of Progressive Corporate Criminal Law,
14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71 (2017).
124. William S. Laufer & Diana C. Robertson, Corporate Ethics Initiatives as Social
Control, 16 J. BUS. ETHICS 1029, 1029 30 (1997).
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still in its infancy. Still, there is good reason for optimism that with each passing
year we will know more about what sorts of compliance programs are effective.
The successor identity approach to transferring liability from predecessors
to successors would tie liability to the best present understanding of which
organizational features are responsible for corporate misconduct. On this
approach, determining which, if any, present-day successor is criminally
identical to, and hence liable for the misconduct of, a criminal predecessor is a
two-step process. The factfinders must first determine what organizational
features whether a poisonous corporate ethos, a gaping compliance deficiency,
or something else entirely was causally responsible for the predecessor's
misconduct. That is to say, the factfinders must isolate the predecessor's criminal
identity. Second, the factfinders must determine whether a successor emerging
from the reorganization inherited those organizational features. If so, whichever
successor did would share a criminal identity with the predecessor. If no
successor inherited them, then none would be subject to the predecessor's
criminal liabilities.
Suppose, for example, at some point in its past, a bank named Fells Wargo
opened a large number of false accounts without customers' knowledge or
permission. 12  After internal reviews at the bank uncovered the practice,
executives met to discuss how proactively to address the prospect of criminal
fines for bank fraud. The bank took three steps: it sold its wealth management
division to an unrelated bank,126 it rebranded itself as "Fells Wargo Re-
Established,"27 and it forced its CEO to resign.
28
Does Fells Wargo Re-Established and/or the bank that acquired the wealth-
management division share a criminal identity with the pre-reorganization Fells
Wargo that committed account fraud? The first step on the successor identity
approach is to identify the organizational feature that is causally responsible for
the fraud. Suppose that after more investigation, it is revealed that the cause was
a high-pressure sales culture that "encouraged" (or rather coerced on pain of
being fired) retail employees to open eight accounts for every customer
125. These facts are loosely based on the Wells Fargo scandal uncovered in 2016. See
Jackie Wattles et al., Wells Fargo's 17-Month Nightmare, CNN (Feb. 5, 2018),
https:Hmoney.cnn.com/2018/02/05/news/companies/wells-fargo-timeline/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3N74-FLKG].
126. While Wells Fargo did not take this step, other banks facing legal trouble have.
See, e.g., Michael Wursthorn, Raymond James to Buy Deutsche Bank's US. Private Client Services Unit,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/raymond-james-to-buy-deutsche-banks-u-s-
private-client-services-unit-1449184983 [https://perma.cc/5NY9-KD4R].
127. Wells Fargo Launched 'Re-Established, 'a New Brand Campaign, WELLS FARGO
(May 7, 2018), https://newsroom.wf.com/press-release/marketing-and-sponsorships/wells-fargo-
launches-re-established-new-brand-campaign [https://perma.cc/C7ES-VEYP].
128. Richard Gonzales, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf Resigns Amid Scandal, NPR
(Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/12/497729371/wells-fargo-ceo-john-
stumpf-resigns-amid-scandal [https://perma.cc/8A4A-2WGR].
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regardless of need.129 The second step is to evaluate whether the various steps
taken during the reorganization were sufficient to change the high-pressure
culture and thereby change Fells Wargo's criminal identity. Rebranding as Fells
Wargo Re-Established would have no impact. Such efforts are public relations
stunts that may communicate an attempt to break with a nefarious past, but they
do not amount to the break itself. Similarly, merely squeezing out the CEO is
unlikely to be enough. Tone from the top can be an important influence on
corporate culture,130 but it would be a rare case where replacing a single
employee could cause a true cultural shift in a large organization.'3' This still
leaves the question of whether the wealth-management division should also take
Fells Wargo's criminal identity with it to the acquiring bank. Supposing the
criminogenic culture only infected the retail division and not wealth-
management, then the identity approach would not hold the latter (or the bank
that acquired it) liable for Fells Wargo's criminal conduct. In sum, Fells Wargo
Re-Established would share the criminal identity of Fells Wargo and be liable
for the fraud. The bank that acquired the wealth management division would not.
The account so far of the successor identity approach is far from complete.
Part V has many more details. But there is enough on the table now to show in
the next subsections how the successor identity approach would be an
improvement over the automaticity of current law. As with the evaluation of
successor liability above, the merit of successor identity turns on how it performs
in relation to the goals of corporate criminal aw rehabilitation, deterrence, and
retribution. On all three, it marks an improvement over the status quo.
B. Rehabilitation
The successor identity approach excels most obviously with criminal law's
rehabilitative purpose. According to rehabilitation theorists, criminal law and
punishment should be structured to promote the reform of criminals. Under the
current law of successor liability, corporations do have some incentive to
improve on compliance during reorganization; by doing so, successors lower the
likelihood of future misconduct and punishment for that as well. The problem is
129. Emily Glazer, How Wells Fargo's High-Pressure Sales Culture Spiraled Out of
Control, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-wells-fargos-high-pressure-
sales-culture-spiraled-out-of-control- 1474053044 [perma.cc/8H83-6ULA].
130. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 31, at 33-34 (citing "tone at the top" as a
significant variable predicting corporate misconduct).
131. If it did, then firing the CEO could be sufficient in itself to extinguish Fells
Wargo's criminal identity. In the actual Wells Fargo case, it would not have been enough. Many actors
throughout the corporate hierarchy were responsible for the high-pressure culture; the culture truly was
"extensive and pervasive." Joe Nocera, Wells Fargo Has Shown Us Its Contemptible Values, BLOOMBERG
(May 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-18/wells-fargo-has-shown-its-
customers-its-true-values-joe-nocera [https://perma.cc/FFN7-GJRD]; Ken Sweet, Wells Fargo Workers:





that corporations, both predecessors and successors, have strong disincentives to
take the first step toward reform investigating for past misconduct and
compliance vulnerabilities. Taking that first step raises the probability of
detection by authorities, and, under current law, detection guarantees liability to
punishment. Even before enforcement authorities come into the picture,
predecessors have an additional incentive under current law to remain ignorant
of past misconduct and to hide any misconduct they happen to discover. Were
counterparties to the reorganization to find out about the misconduct, they would
demand a discount for the liabilities that will come to taint them too.132 Though
the popularity of self-initiated compliance programs133 may seem to contradict
this observation, these tend to be off-the-shelf "paper programs.' 34 They are
more effectively designed for ticking off boxes to secure favorable exercises of
charging 35 and sentencing discretion36 than to detect and address misconduct.
An approach that keys successors' liability to shared criminal identity
would enhance corporations' incentives to detect and remedy organizational
vulnerabilities during reorganization. Predecessor corporations who detect their
own misconduct could remedy the vulnerability that led to it and, assured that
liability for past crimes will not pass on to successors, demand full value from
counterparties. Successors would have a double incentive to fix any
vulnerabilities they discover during reorganization to prevent future
misconduct and to nullify their liability for the misconduct of their predecessors.
132. See, e.g., Gregg W. Kettles, Bad Policy: CERCLA 's Amended Liability for New
Purchasers, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 28-30 (2002) (discussing how successor liability under
prior CERCLA provisions acted as a disincentive to successor-buyers and a deterrent to predecessor-
sellers because buyers would require steep discounts to step into the shoes of potentially liable
predecessors).
133. See generally William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 391 (2018).
134. See David Hess, Ethical Infrastructures and Evidence-Based Corporate
Compliance and Ethics Programs: Policy Implications from the Empirical Evidence, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. &
Bus. 317, 320-21 (2016) (discussing the amended Organizational Sentencing Guideline's emphasis on
promoting ethical organizational culture as an effort to fight paper programs, programs that exist on paper
but are not supported by corporate culture and thus do not influence employee behavior); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 542
(2003) (exploring and theorizing about empirical data that strongly suggests "that internal compliance
structures are largely window-dressing mechanisms implemented by corporate management to reduce
liability or provide the appearance of legitimacy to corporate stakeholders and the marketplace at large");
Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an Affirmative Defense to Corporate
Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 45 (2012) (noting the irony of the incentives corporations
face regarding compliance: "that companies receive the maximum benefit from compliance programs that
appear to comply with the Guidelines but that do not actually detect or deter wrongful conduct");
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution i A Post-Enron World The
Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1105-06 (2006) (discussing the
Thompson Memo's focus on having prosecutors explore the strength and seriousness of a corporation's
compliance program to ensure that they are not mere paper programs).
135. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 113, §§ 9-28.300, 9-28.800; Hess, supra note
134, at 331 (explaining that corporations face dual incentives to adopt compliance programs, either to gain
more favorable sentencing or settlement agreements or "to avoid prosecution under the DOJ's charging
policy").
136. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5.
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By effectively patching these vulnerabilities, successors would, according to the
successor identity approach, break with the criminal identity of their
predecessors. Such successors would emerge free of their predecessors' criminal
liabilities.
C. Deterrence
The successor identity approach may initially seem a step backwards when
it comes to deterrence, at least when focusing superficially at the level of the
corporate entity. Under the current law, liability for criminal conduct is virtually
inextinguishable until satisfied only long-standing dissolution or the tolling of
the statute of limitations will do the trick. Reorganization and improvements to
compliance can have no effect. This creates a strong ex ante incentive not to
commit crime in the first place.
Will corporate entities really be deterred from misconduct if they can
commit a crime, reap the benefits, and then insulate themselves from liability by
reorganizing and shedding their criminal identity? To the extent this is a concern,
it is less a weakness of the successor identity approach than a reflection of the
basic tension between criminal law's rehabilitative and deterrent purposes.
13 7
Fully achieving one can only come at the expense of fully achieving the other;
providing incentives to reform necessarily undermines the disincentives to
commit crime in the first place.
It is important not to overstate the hit entity-level deterrence would take
under successor identity. Successors and predecessors that fail to discover and
remedy organizational vulnerabilities would be criminally punished and
deterred, just as they are under current law. Furthermore, successors and
predecessors that do reform would still face the same non-punitive sanctions
administrative, civil, and restitutionary that hey currently do.138 These would
have the same deterrent effect under the successor liability approach as they do
under the law of successor liability.
The true deterrent force of successor identity becomes apparent upon
moving past superficial, entity-level considerations to the complex relationship
between corporations and their employees. Successor identity could mitigate the
agency cost problem whereby employees secure private benefits by committing
crime that ultimately harms their corporate employer. Successors who have
reformed away the organizational vulnerabilities of their criminal predecessors
137. PAUL H. ROBINSON ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASE STUDIES AND CONTROVERSIES
91-92 (2017).
138. See V.S. Khanma, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1487-88 (1996) ("The discrepancies between enforcement powers in public
criminal and public civil cases have greatly diminished since that time, raising the question of why
corporate criminal liability is necessary today."); W. Allen Spurgeon & Terrence P. Fagan, Criminal
Liability for Life-Endangering Corporate Conduct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 400, 405, 409 (1981)
(noting that Congress has provided criminal, civil, and administrative remedies against harmful corporate
conduct in an attempt to enforce social norms upon corporate conduct).
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would have less to worry about reporting past employee misconduct to
authorities.'39 Since these successors would not share an identity with their
criminal predecessors, they would no longer need to fear punishment for what
the employees did while on the predecessor's payroll. Even if successors do not
self-report individual misconduct to authorities, the successor identity approach
raises the expected costs of crime for individual employees. By encouraging
predecessor and successor corporations to detect misconduct and reform, the
successor identity approach increases the chance that individual misconduct will
be detected and sanctioned internally.
To the extent that deterrence theorists ultimately care about preventing
corporate crime, however that happens,140 they have a further reason to embrace
successor identity. By encouraging rehabilitation (discussed in the previous
Subsection), the successor identity approach would prevent crime by reducing
the chance that the successors of criminal predecessors will reoffend.14 1 This
preventive mechanism is more reliable than the sort of deterrence on which the
current law of successor liability relies. Predecessors and successors presently
have two options when they discover misconduct. They can invest in reform.
This would prevent liability for future misconduct but would increase the chance
of having the past misconduct detected and punished. This is the option
deterrence theorists hope corporations will take. But predecessors and successors
could instead invest in better concealing the past misconduct and similar future
misconduct.142 Which option will be in any corporation's best interest reform
or conceal will depend on case-specific facts. The successor identity approach
would put a strong thumb on the scale in favor of reform. It would do this by
making the reform option more appealing. In addition to the benefits it currently
brings corporations (less expected liability for future misconduct), reform would
also absolve successors of liability for their predecessors' past misconduct.
D. Retribution
There are two ways to think about what retribution means for corporations,
but one argument shows for both how the successor identity approach
outperforms successor liability. Retributivists think that punishment should give
criminals their just deserts143 and that the justice deserved is proportional to the
139. See Arlen, supra note 84, at 325.
140. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 31-34 (2012) (explaining how deterrence can affect corporate behavior, perhaps in more
just ways than in personal criminal law).
141. See RAMSEY CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA: OBSERVATIONS ON ITS NATURE,
CAUSES, PREVENTION AND CONTROL 220 (1970) ("Rehabilitation is also the one clear way that criminal
justice processes can significantly reduce crime.").
142. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Too Vast to Succeed, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1109, 1119
(2016); Sanchirico, supra note 86, at 1361.
143. Moore, supra note 31.
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seriousness of the offense.14 4 But retributivists think of just deserts in different
ways. According to empirical desert theorists, deciding whether and how much
to punish a defendant is a sociological matter.145 Defendants should be punished
when and to the extent that society thinks such punishment is appropriate. For
empirical desert theorists, comparing the successor identity approach to
successor liability requires assessing people's intuitions about when successors
deserve punishment for predecessors' crimes.
Deontological desert is another approach to determining what punishment,
if any, criminals deserve.146 On this sort of theory, the retributive appropriateness
of punishment turns on substantive morality whether the defendant actually
deserves punishment. Where individuals are concerned, the identity principle
demands punishment only of present-day defendants who are identical to the
people who committed past crimes. Rightly or wrongly,14 7 people generally think
there is a fact of the matter about whether the individual in the courtroom is the
same person as the one who committed the crime.148 Any deviation from that
fact, e.g., by punishing someone who is not identical to the criminal, works a
grave injustice, even if it is supported by strong consequentialist policy. As
William Blackstone famously expressed, "It is better that ten guilty persons
escape than that one innocent suffer."'
149
For deontological desert theorists who think that corporations are proper
objects of punishment,150 the identity principle has an important role to play. It
requires that successors really share an identity with any predecessors for whose
crimes they are punished. Only then would punishing successors for the crimes
of predecessors satisfy the demands of justice. To date, no theorists of corporate
personhood have had anything to say about how corporate identity persists
through time and across reorganizations. In the absence of a ready-developed
theory, the safest option for the deontological desert theorist would be to start
with common intuitions on the matter.'5 ' Consulting and systematizing intuitions
is a familiar and widely accepted way of inquiring into substantive morality.1
52
144. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 6-19 (1993).
145. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 137, at 83.
146. Id.
147. See Theodore Sider, Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual
Analysis, 15 PHIL. PERSP. 189 (2001).
148. Some philosophers think this is an inescapable consequence of our first-personal
experience as agents. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian
Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1989).
149. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352 (1769). See also Genesis 18:23-
32.
150. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY,
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2013).
151. It may strike some readers as odd to talk about retribution where corporations are
concerned. But, as I argue elsewhere, there are expressive forms of retributivism that are particularly apt
for the corporate context. See Diamantis, supra note 36, at 2061-62; see also BILL WRINGE, AN
EXPRESSIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT (2016).
152. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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So, even though they have different starting premises, both deontological
and empirical desert theorists will want to build theories of corporate identity
that start with common intuition. That is where some cognitive science from the
last twenty years can help. Though some scholars think that retributive impulses
toward corporations are confused and unsustainable,5 3 cognitive scientists now
know that they are natural and normal features of our psychology. We have
cognitive mechanisms that incline us to think of corporations as though they
were moral agents distinct from the people composing them. 154 People do not
think of all groups in this way, but they are more likely to do so when the group
has a high level of internal cohesion155  what cognitive scientists call
"entitivity."'' 5 6 Corporations, with their generally hierarchical structure and goal-
directed operation, are archetypical entitive groups. As a result, people perceive
corporations as being capable of intentional action157 and as deserving
punishment when they act badly.
5 8
That line of research only takes the matter so far. Even if people intuitively
think corporations should be punished for their bad acts, this still leaves open the
question of when a past bad act of a predecessor is an act for which its successor
deserves punishment. The answer will depend on when a predecessor's act also
counts as an act of its successor. And this, in turn, will depend on people's
intuitions about how corporate identity persists across time, particularly over the
sorts of radical changes that reorganization involves. Cognitive scientists have
just started to look into this issue too. Though that data is much more
preliminary, the discoveries so far favor the successor identity approach.
153. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1392 (2009) ("[A]ttributing blame to a corporation is no more
sensible than attributing blame to a dagger, a fountain pen, a Chevrolet, or any other instrumentality of
crime."); John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 310, 350 (2003) ("Corporations neither deserve nor attract our sympathy .... [A]s such
they do not deserve sympathy simply because they are not human. For that reason alone, they should not
be the subjects of criminal prosecution."). But see Henry W. Edgerton, Corporate CriminalResponsibility,
36 YALE L.J. 827, 832 (1927).
154. See D.T. Campbell, Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of
Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities, 3 BEHAV. SC. 14 (1958).
155. See R.P. Abelson et al., Perceptions of the Collective Other, 2 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH REV. 243 (1998).
156. See Jennifer L. Welbourne, The Impact of Perceived Entitivity on Inconsistency
Resolution for Groups and Individuals, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 481, 481-508 (1999)
(discussing entitivity generally and perceptions of collective groups).
157. See N. Dasgupta et al., Group Entitativity and Group Perception: Associations
Between Physical Features and Psychological Judgment, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 991 (1999);
M. J. O'Laughlin & B.F. Malle, How People Explain Actions Performed by Groups and Individuals, 82
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 95 (2010).
158. Anna-Kaisa Newheiser et al., Why Do We Punish Groups? High Entitativity
Promotes Moral Suspicion, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 931 (2012); S. J. Sherman & E. J. Percy,
Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and Why Collective Entities Are Likely to Be Held
Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual Members, 19 J.L. & POL'Y 137 (2010).
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Scientific work on intuitions about corporate identity builds on previous
results in cognitive science about identity more generally.5 9 One early discovery
was that people distinguish between "accidental" and "essential" traits, where
only changes to the latter result in changes in identity.16 The accidental traits
tend to be surface level, while essential traits tend to be deeper and possibly
hidden from view.16 1 Essential traits also tend to be those that are causally
efficacious.6 2
More recent studies have focused on the importance of normative valence
(whether a trait is good, bad, or neutral) in determining whether a trait is essential
or accidental. Studies about essential traits in individual human beings suggest
that normative valence perceived as being good or bad, rather than neutral
plays an important role.163 Traits that have a normative valence are more likely
to be essential. The newest data suggests that these results hold for corporate
people too.164 For example, if a corporation undergoes a change that causes it to
lose its positively valenced traits, then people are likely to judge that it has lost
its identity.16 More importantly for present purposes, "[i]f an entity is explicitly
described as having a bad essence, it will be viewed as losing its identity if it
improves.' '166
To test this effect, scientists presented subjects with scenarios about a
fictional school in Nazi Germany.167 The scenarios described the school
undergoing various changes and then asked subjects whether the school after the
change was the same school, or a different one. Subjects were significantly more
likely to say the school ost its identity when it changed a normatively valenced
trait, like when it switched from focusing its curriculum on Nazi ideology to
traditional academic subjects. Normatively neutral changes, like turnover in
administration, did not induce the same effect. Though the studies focused on
schools, the authors believe their results should extend to other collectives,
168
presumably including corporations.
159. Lance Rips et al., Tracing the Identity of Objects, 113 PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2006).
160. Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols, The Essential Moral Self 131 COGNITION
159 (2014).
161. S. Blok et al., Individuals and Their Concepts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-
THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY (J.D. Moore & K. Stenning eds.,
2005); D. Geoffrey Hall et al., Preschoolers' Use of Form Class Cues to Learn Descriptive Proper Names,
74 CHILD DEV. 1547 (2003).
162. Lance Rips & Susan Hespos, Divisions of the Physical World: Concepts of Objects
and Substances, 141 PSYCHOL. BULL. 786 (2015).
163. George Newman et. al., Beliefs About the True Self Explain Asymmetries Based
on Moral Judgment, 39 COGNITIVE SC. 96 (2015); George Newman et al., Value Judgments and the True
Self, 40 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 203 (2014).
164. Julian De Freitas et al., Normative Judgments and Individual Essence, 41
COGNITIVE SC. 382 (2017).
165. Id. at 386-88.
166. Id. at 393 (emphasis removed).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 396.
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Combining the insights about the importance of causal efficacy and
normative valence suggests that the essential trait of a criminal corporation the
trait to which its identity is linked is whatever trait caused it to commit crime.
In the context of a criminal trial, this negatively valenced trait is likely to be the
most salient, both because of its strong normative valence and because of its
important causal role. If a successor inherits this trait, people should be inclined
to judge that it shares an identity with its criminal predecessor, and hence
deserves punishment. If, however, in the course of the reorganization, the
successor does not inherit the trait (perhaps the trait got reformed or a different
successor inherited it), people should be more likely to judge that the successor
does not share the predecessor's identity. In short, ordinary retributive intuitions
about the persistence of corporate criminal identity and desert should fit the
successor identity approach. According to these intuitions, the current law of
successor liability over-punishes corporations because it holds successors liable
for predecessors' crimes even when the two do not share an identity. Since the
successor identity approach aligns with folk intuitions, it is well-positioned to
fulfill corporate criminal law's retributive goals (whether deontological or
empirical).
Retributivists might still have some concerns. The successor identity
approach opens the possibility that a predecessor could commit a crime and then
escape punishment using a well-structured reorganization. It may seem in these
circumstances that there is some retributive residue that needs addressing. If the
criminal essence approach allows cases where a crime will go unpunished, is that
not contrary to the retributive spirit?
Maybe. Part of the retributive residue may be addressed by convicting and
punishing individuals. Though it is not a focus of this Article, individual
punishment for white-collar crime is an important prong of prosecutors'
response. Individual criminals must face justice as well, regardless of whether
the corporation of which they are a part has sufficiently changed its identity to
avoid its own punishment.
169
There may still be cases where a predecessor has committed a crime even
though no individual within it has. 170 In these cases, should the predecessor
subsequently change its identity through reorganization, thereby escaping
liability, there would be no suitable object of punishment on the successor
identity approach, corporate or individual. A crime would go totally unpunished.
This could initially seem like something that would worry retributivists, but the
169. See generally Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, to all Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Individual Accountability for
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download
[https://perma.cc/RC96-XJA7].
170. See Julie O'Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? A Response to
Professor Schmeyer's Proposal, 16 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2002), in JULIE O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 176-77 (2016); see also, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d
844, 856 (lst Cir. 1987) (upholding the conviction of defendant bank despite prior acquittal of all
employees involved in the misconduct).
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worry would be misplaced. With respect to individual criminals, most everyone,
retributivists included, accepts that some crimes must go unpunished, as when
the criminal has died.'1 Punishing someone else in the criminal's place would
certainly be unjust. But this is exactly what would happen were a successor
corporation punished for the crimes of a predecessor with whom it does not share
a criminal identity.
The concern over unpunished crimes should be weaker still in the corporate
case where the corporate criminal, after reorganization, is no longer around.
Those who ultimately bear the brunt of a corporate sanction are the usually
innocent corporate stakeholders, like individual shareholders and employees. 
172
As such, the prospect of punishing a corporation when not strictly necessarily
should be particularly unappealing to retributivists.
Another sort of concern retributivists might have with the successor identity
approach is that it may seem unfair vis-A-vis individuals. Retributivists are
concerned that the criminal justice system treats similarly situated defendants
similarly.' 73 Disparities in punishment,'7' enforcement,'17 or standards of
liability176 raise justice concerns, particularly where the disparity seems to be
motivated by animus against already disadvantaged groups.177 The successor
identity approach may seem to treat corporate people very differently from
natural people it gives the former the option of escaping liability by
reorganizing and reforming.
While the successor identity approach does end up treating corporations
differently from natural people, the disparity is not the sort that should worry
171. See In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'dsub nom. Swidler
& Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (discussing that lack of criminal liability after death);
Gerard V. Bradley, Retribution: The Central Aim of Punishment, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 23
(2003) ("Depriving the criminal of [an] ill-gotten advantage is therefore the central focus of punishment.
Since that advantage primarily consists of a wrongful exercise of freedom of choice and action, the most
appropriate means to restore order is to deprive the criminal of that freedom.").
172. See Alschuler, supra note 153, at 1366-67 ("This punishment is inflicted instead
on human beings whose guilt remains unproven. Innocent shareholders pay the fines, and innocent
employees, creditors, customers, and communities sometimes feel the pinch too.").
173. David I. Shapiro, Sentencing the Reformed Addict: Departure Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Problem of Drug Rehabilitation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 2051, 2069 (1991)
("[T]he dictates of retribution doctrine ... suggest that similarly situated defendants should receive the
same punishment.") (footnotes omitted).
174. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in
the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1675-1715 (1998) (providing empirical evidence regarding disparities in death
sentences based on race).
175. See, e.g., Drug Sentencing Practices and Issues, 18 FED. SENT'G REP. 289, 289
(2006) (Statement of Wade Henderson, Executive Director, Leadership Conference on Human Rights, to
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) (noting some serious disparities in our criminal justice
system and looking at disparities in enforcement as the cause).
176. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimination: Beyond
"'Damned Lies", 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 550 (1993) ("Allowing a finding of liability to be based upon
disparities that are statistically significant but not 'gross' places undue faith in statistical models and
threatens to result in improper findings of liability.").
177. See generally Baldus et al., supra note 174; Browne, supra note 176.
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retributivists. Unlike the most concerning disparities in criminal justice, it would
not be motivated by any sort of animus. Rather, it would be motivated by an
acknowledgment of the important differences in the structure of identity for
corporations and natural people. Just as fairness demands treating like cases
alike, it requires treating different cases differently. 178 While the identity of
natural persons is largely grounded in a biological form, 179 corporate identity is
more abstract and fluid. With present technology, corporate identity is easier to
change than individual identity. 80 Perhaps that will one day change, forcing
criminal law to rethink how it punishes present-day people for crimes committed
in the distant past. Until then, ignoring this difference between corporations and
natural people, as the current law of successor liability does, creates a disparity
that truly should concern retributivists the law sometimes requires courts to
punish successor corporations for crimes they did not commit.
Even so, one concern may still loom large for all perspectives on the
purpose of corporate criminal aw. If reorganization and reform could eliminate
criminal liability, would corporations not take advantage of this by committing
crime, reaping its benefits, reorganizing and reforming, and then repeating with
impunity? This is indeed a worry that the successor identity approach introduces.
As discussed below,' 8' a modification to the successor identity approach may
help address it. For now, it is worth emphasizing that the cause for concern is
significantly more limited than it may seem at first. The sort of gamesmanship
at issue would be a rare, one-off opportunity. If a successor corporation were
truly reformed of the criminal identity of its predecessors, it would not have the
predecessors' disposition to misconduct. Lacking that predisposition, the
successor would be unlikely to repeat the cycle of misconduct and reform. If
whatever trait led the predecessor to try to game the criminal justice system
remained, the successor would likely still share its criminal identity and be liable
for the original crime. Suppose, for example, that C-suite executives enable such
gamesmanship by communicating to middle management that sking for legal
forgiveness is preferable to asking for permission where doing so boosts
corporate profits. Bona fide reform of the corporation's criminal identity would
involve taking whatever measures necessary to halt that message and its uptake.
The gamesmanship should cease with the reform of its source.
178. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too
Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107 (2013) (discussing the treatment of children and adults
in the criminal justice system and proposing that children should receive a "youth discount" when
considering their culpability and sentencing); Martin Guggenheim, Graham v. Florida and a Juvenile's
Right to Age-Appropriate Sentencing, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 500 (2012) (comparing the
historical treatment of children and adults with modern Supreme Court precedent, arguing that the latest
cases show that children and adults must be treated ifferently in the criminal justice system).
179. Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A
Theory of Constitutional Personhoodfor Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1445
(1992) ("Natural persons are biological beings, which currently includes only humans.").
180. See also Diamantis, supra note 48 (discussing the inflexibility of individual
character and the relative changeability of corporate character).
181. See infra Part V.C.
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V. Details and Refinements
The successor identity approach would punish successors for predecessor
crimes only when the former inherit whatever organizational trait was originally
responsible for the crime. It would outperform the current law of successor
liability which invariably holds successors liable for predecessor crimes by
encouraging corporate reform, preventing more corporate crime, and giving
results that align better with the interests of justice. So far, successor identity is
just a policy framework. Many details remain, some of which are considered
below.
A. Timing the Inquiry
The successor identity approach would block the transmission of liability
from predecessors to successors when the two do not share an identity. It has
nothing to say yet about when and who in the criminal justice process should
determine whether that condition is satisfied. There are a few options.
One possibility would be to hold off until sentencing. The Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines (the "Guidelines") provide fine reductions for specified
conditions,182 almost removing fines entirely in some circumstances.
183
Provisions relating to successor identity could be added to the mix. Presently the
Guidelines call for a reduction if the corporate convict had an effective
compliance program at the time the crime was committed.'84 So far, only nine
corporations have received effective compliance program credit,'85 which raises
the obvious suspicion that the credit is not functioning as intended. One possible
problem is that the credit (a three-point reduction to the defendant firm's
culpability score) may not be substantial enough'86 to induce corporations to
implement effective compliance programs prospectively.187 Another possibility
is hindsight bias a sentencing judge must determine whether the corporation
had an effective compliance program that nonetheless did not prevent the crime
that the corporation committed.88 The fact that a compliance program failed may
bias sentencing judges to think it was ineffective.
182. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, §§ 8C2.5, 8C2.8.
183. Id. § 8C3.3. The smallest minimum fine multiplier is .05. Id. § 8C2.6.
184. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
185. See Annual Fiscal Year Sentencing Statistics (Oct. 1-Sept. 30), U.S. SENT'G
COMM'N: SOURCEBOOK OF FED. SENT'G STAT. tbl.54,
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive [http://perma.cc/DQ7F-F3EE] (showing that a total of
seven corporations received credit for effective compliance programs between 1996 and 2016); Maurice
E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 IOWA J. CORP. L. 769, 783-84, n.79
(2014) (reporting an additional two instances of finding effective compliance programs between 1992 and
1996 that are not available on the Sentencing Commission's website).
186. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 8C2.5(f).
187. Arlen, supra note 84, at 337.
188. See Stucke, supra note 185, at 813 ("[H]indsight bias research shows how one is
far more likely to condemn unethical behavior when the behavior leads to a bad rather than a good
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Were successor identity incorporated as a Guidelines factor, it would take
a different approach. Sentencing courts would evaluate the present-day
compliance programs of convicted successors, rather than focusing on the pre-
violation program of their predecessors. Since the object of assessment would be
present programs, hindsight bias should not be an issue. Furthermore,
implementing the successor identity approach as a sentencing factor would call
for something more substantial than the modest credit of the Guidelines'
effective compliance provisions. If the successor defendant does not share the
criminal predecessor's identity, the court should impose no fine at all for the
predecessor's misconduct. This would be a much more substantial inducement,
even though the successor may still have to make non-punitive payments, like
restitution. 189
Despite the appeal of the parallel to effective compliance provisions in the
Sentencing Guidelines, waiting until sentencing to assess a successor's identity
may not be the most efficient approach. It would force trial courts and successor
corporations to go through the expense of adjudication even in cases where they
would not be eligible for punishment. At stake are not only the legal expenses,
but also the substantial reputational and market disadvantages that corporations
suffer from indictment through trial and conviction.190 If the identity assessment
were made at some earlier stage in the criminal justice process, successors who
do not share an identity with criminal predecessors could forgo the need for a
criminal trial and conviction. They may still be liable for restitution, but only to
the extent they have not already paid it voluntarily or through civil or
administrative processes.19 1 Even probation (another kind of punishment the
Guidelines allow) 192 would likely be inappropriate in cases where the successor
has no fine to pay'93 and where it does not share its criminal predecessor's
organizational defects.194 A further difficulty of waiting until sentencing is that
upon conviction, in many industries, corporations are automatically subject to a
series of devastating collateral consequences, like debarment.195 In light of these
outcome even when controlling for the action of the actor being judged." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
189. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 8C 1.1.
190. See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
CriminalLiability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994).
191. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 30, § 8B1.2 cmt.
192. Id. ch. 8, pt. D.
193. See id. §§ 8D1.3, 8D1.4.
194. Id. § 8D1.4(b)(1).
195. Peter R. Reilly, Justice Deferred Is Justice Denied We Must End Our Failed
Experiment in Deferring Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 307, 320-22 (2015) ("If
a corporation decides to go to trial and loses, it might face debarment or exclusion .... For companies
that depend heavily on contracts with the federal government, exclusion and debarment can amount to a
corporate death penalty." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Larry Thompson, The
Blameless Corporation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1323, 1325-26 (2009) ("The other dimension of the
conundrum of corporate criminal liability, which is the collateral consequences if you are convicted, is
enormous .... So, it's not very realistic with respect to thinking about corporate criminal liability of a
corporation subjecting itself to a jury trial.").
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collateral effects, the decision about corporate identity should take place at some
point earlier than conviction.
These arguments may seem to favor putting the inquiry into the hands of
prosecutors at the start of the criminal justice process. Prosecutors already
evaluate corporate suspect's compliance shortcomings when deciding whether
and how to charge them.196 From an efficiency perspective, asking prosecutors
to evaluate whether successor suspects share a criminal identity with their
predecessors would be optimal. If prosecutors determine there is no shared
criminal identity, they could decide not to indict the successor, sparing it
unnecessary costs (legal and reputational).'19  The trouble with relying on
prosecutors is that their charging decisions are entirely discretionary198 and not
subject to any kind of judicial review.199 This has led to concerns that
prosecutors' decisions can be the unprincipled products of private prosecutorial
interests and imbalanced bargaining power vis-A-vis corporate suspects.200
There may be a way to capture the efficiency benefits of having prosecutors
evaluate successor identity without the risks of making that decision
unreviewable. Trial courts could be the ultimate arbiters of successor identity.
Putting the issue of identity in the courts' hands makes conceptual sense. A
successor claiming that it does not share an identity with a criminal predecessor
is effectively making an ordinary claim of innocence claiming that someone
else committed the crime. Forcing successors to wait until trial to make this
argument would impose potentially unnecessary legal and reputational costs on
them. Those could be reduced in some cases where non-identity could provide
grounds for a motion to dismiss, perhaps because the prosecution failed to offer
any evidence that the successor inherited its predecessor's criminal identity.2 0
More commonly, though, successor suspects could advance non-identity
196. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 113, § 9-28.800.
197. See, e.g., Sharon Oded, Coughing Up Executives or Rolling the Dice?: Individual
Accountability for Corporate Corruption, 35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 49, 59 (2016) ("Apart from saving
the tremendous costs of a long-running trial, such as representation and business upheaval, DPAs and
NPAs may materially reduce reputation damages."); Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife,
and the "'Culture of Compliance ", 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 715 (2012) (noting the benefits of entering a
DPA in that "the firm largely avoids the stigma and injury to reputation that follows from formal
prosecution").
198. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 113, § 9-28.100 ("Federal prosecutors must
maintain public confidence in the way in which we exercise our charging discretion. This endeavor
requires the thoughtful analysis of all facts and circumstances presented in a given case.").
199. See United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 740 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("By
rejecting the DPA based primarily on concerns about the prosecution's charging choices, the district court
exceeded its authority under the Speedy Trial Act.").
200. Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates
Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 214 (2016) ("D/NPA
mandates result from prosecutors' use of informal enforcement to create new legal duties duties that can
be enforced through the imposition of criminal sanctions that otherwise would not be imposed .... This
use of informal enforcement implicates the rule of law because it enables prosecutors to reach beyond the
constraints on the scope of authority that normally bind them, without adequate ex ante or ex post
oversight.").
201. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
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arguments to prosecutors pre-indictment. Prosecutors evaluate the merits of a
case before making charging decisions.0 2 If a successor corporation has a strong
claim of innocence premised on non-identity, prosecutors will be less likely to
indict.20 3 Since the matter may go to trial and be reviewed by a court, successors
making identity arguments to prosecutors could expect a more objective
assessment than if prosecutors had exclusive authority over the question.
B. Questions for the Jury
If the successor identity approach were implemented by having courts
adjudicate identity, the question would ultimately go to a jury if not resolved by
a judge in a motion to dismiss beforehand.20 4 Were a successor defendant to raise
a claim challenging identity with a criminal predecessor, the jury would have a
two-fold task. The first step would be to determine which features of the
predecessor corporation were responsible for its criminal conduct, whether by
enabling, encouraging, or failing to detect and prevent it. This would be a
factually intensive inquiry into the sorts of features that organizational science
says can impact employee behavior, things such as corporate ethos and
compliance procedures. Most jurors would lack the background expertise needed
to evaluate these properly. Effective advocates would likely call on expert
witnesses to help frame the inquiry.20 5 In this regard, the first step would not
differ from others in corporate criminal law where experts in accounting,20 6
finance,207 environmental science,208 etc., are a necessary aid to the jury.
The second step would be for the jury to determine whether the defendant,
a successor corporation, inherited the organizational features identified in the
first step. Such features are more likely to follow the lines of business implicated
in the defective ethos or compliance.20 9 Where the successor resulted from a
202. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 113, § 9-28.100 ("In exercising that discretion,
prosecutors should consider the.., statements of principles that summarize the considerations they should
weigh and the practices they should follow in discharging their prosecutorial responsibilities. Prosecutors
should ensure that the general purposes of the criminal law appropriate punishment for the defendant,
deterrence of further criminal conduct by the defendant, deterrence of criminal conduct by others,
protection of the public from dangerous and fraudulent conduct, rehabilitation, and restitution for
victims are adequately met, taking into account the special nature of the corporate 'person."').
203. See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
204. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(1).
205. See Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1182 (1991)
("We call expert witnesses to testify about matters that are beyond the ordinary understanding of lay
people (that is both the major practical justification and a formal legal requirement for expert testimony),
and then we ask lay judges and jurors to judge their testimony. This is a very general problem.").
206. Sofia Adrogue & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires After Kumho: The Bottom Line
on Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 431, 477 (2000).
207. See generally id.
208. See generally Kim K. Burke, The Use of Experts in Environmental Litigation: A
Practitioner's Guide, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 111 (1997).
209. See, e.g., Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Liability of Corporations and Corporate Officers,
Directors, and Shareholders Under Superfund: Should Corporate and Agency Law Concepts Apply?, 14
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consolidation, merger, or acquisition, the question would be whether the
reorganization somehow reformed the organizational vulnerability as it
combined lines of business. Perhaps, as a result of the reorganization, the
criminal counterparty adopted the better ethos, or was subject to the stricter
compliance procedures, of the innocent counterparty.2 10 Where the successor
defendant resulted from a spin-off, the relevant inquiry would likely be whether
the defendant, or some other successor, inherited the line of business in which
the criminal conduct occurred.
As with all case-by-case, factually intensive inquiries, there will be some
inherent uncertainty about successor identity.211 Business ethicists,
organizational psychologists, big data programmers, and compliance experts are
constantly learning more about the sources of corporate crime.212 As this
knowledge filters into the courtroom, it will aid juries in making more accurate
determinations of successor identity. Even if this knowledge were already
complete, the successor identity approach would lead to less certain results than
the very predictable, one-track mechanism of successor liability. But having
more discriminating doctrines that are more likely to get the right results always
brings increased uncertainty.213 In this case, the tradeoff is well worth the
improvements to rehabilitation, deterrence, and justice of the successor identity
approach.
C. Degrees of Identity, Degrees of Liability
As presented so far, the successor identity approach is binary: successors
either are or are not identical to their predecessors, and they assume either all or
none of their predecessors' criminal liability. Some identity theorists do not think
that identity works like this.214 They think that identity comes in degrees, so that
it could make sense to speak of successors that are more identical or less identical
to their predecessors. There could be some advantages to such a modification.
J. CORP. L. 839, 882 (1989) ("The continuity of business operation theory concentrates on the continuation
of the line of business and derives much strength from an underlying federal statute that advances broad,
remedial objectives in the public interest.").
210. The Department of Justice has exhibited some interest in implementing such an
approach informally. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW,
Opinion Procedure Release, No. 08-02 (2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/0802.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U4G-XHUD].
211. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931,951 (1988) (noting "that some
degree of uncertainty exists whenever judges and juries are called upon to apply substantive standards,"
but noting that judges must be very careful when such standards involve criminal liability and
punishment).
212. See Laufer, supra note 133.
213. See, e.g., Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 384-85
(1985) (discussing the pros and cons of rules and standards generally as well as for legal theories, such as
criminal deterrence, specifically).
214. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 276-77 (1984) (explaining that
identity comes in varying degrees).
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A related idea sometimes applies in the tort context, where courts must
assess product liability and punitive damages against uccessors. The "degree of
identity" test "asks whether enough of the predecessor effectively has been
absorbed into the successor so that by punishing the successor, in effect, the
predecessor is being punished.215 The degree of identity approach recognizes
that "[w]hether a successor corporation is the alter ego of its predecessor is a[n
open] question of fact. '2 16 Though the test, as developed in tort law, focuses on
wrong sources of continuity continuity in personnel and ownership2' 7  it
provides some legal precedent for the idea that that successor identity can come
in degrees.
The degree of identity test from tort law is, in the end, also binary if the
degree of identity between successor and predecessor is high enough, a court
applying the test will treat them as being fully identical. A more interesting
approach for present purposes would be to let the result of the test also come in
degrees. If successors could be more or less identical to their predecessors,
perhaps the criminal liability they inherit could be proportional to their degree of
identity. A successor that is largely identical to its predecessor (i.e., one that has
taken few effective steps to reform) could inherit all or most of its criminal
liabilities; a successor that is largely non-identical (i.e., one that has taken many
effective steps to reform) would inherit little or none.
Suppose, for example, that a bank in the process of reorganization discovers
it violated the Currency Transaction Reporting Act.21 8 It learns that on several
occasions, it failed to report currency transactions made by a customer at
different bank branches in excess of the statutory trigger.21 9 Suppose further that
there were three organizational defects that contributed to the violations: an
inadequate legal training program for bank tellers, missing systems for sharing
information between branches, and compliance personnel with a cavalier attitude
toward the risks of money laundering. In the process of reorganization, any or
all of these defects may be remedied: by implementing new training protocols,
215. Keith A. Ketterling, A Proposalfor the Proper Use of Punitive Damages Against
a Successor, 11 J. CORP. L. 765, 784 (1986).
216. 1 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORP. § 48 (2016).
217. See Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., L.L.C., 976 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2013)
("To determine whether one business is a continuation of a predecessor, the Court should consider whether
there was purchasing or selling of assets between the entities and if there is a common identity of officers,
directors and stock holders in the selling and purchasing corporations." (quotation marks and citations
omitted)); Baltimore Luggage Co. v. Holtzman, 80 Md. App. 282, 297 (1989) ("[Indicia of continuation
are] common officers, directors, and stockholders; and only one corporation in existence after the
completion of the sale of assets.") (quoting 15 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORP. (Cum. Supp. 1988)); Martin
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 657 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) ("We believe that when a legal change
in corporate identity is not accompanied by major changes in the identity of the predecessor's
shareholders, officers, directors, and management personnel, the imposition of punitive damages against
the successor for the reckless conduct of the predecessor may be proper as advancing the goals of
punishment and deterrence.").
218. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5332 (2018).
219. This example is based off United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844,
856 (lst Cir. 1987).
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building new information systems, and replacing the compliance personnel. If
all three were fixed, the bank's successors would likely not inherit the criminal
identity. However, if fewer than all three changes were accomplished, the
successor may share in the criminal identity in proportion to the number of
changes made.
Allowing for degrees of successor identity would certainly complicate
things and thereby increase uncertainty, but it could have some advantages. One
is that it could help the successor identity approach address ome of the
gamesmanship it could incentivize. As discussed, the successor identity
approach could allow for corporations to plan to commit crime, reap its benefits,
and then reorganize in ways that eliminate their criminal liability. Introducing
degrees of identity may be best applicable for such cases where the successor,
while not entirely identical to its predecessor, is not entirely different either. This
would mitigate (in proportion to the difference of identity), but not eliminate (in
proportion to the overlap in identity), the criminal liability the successor inherits.
This would help discourage that sort of manipulation.
Introducing degrees of identity could also help address another potential
problem: What happens if authorities discover the criminal conduct of a
predecessor while the corporate reorganization and reform are still underway?
For example, perhaps the innocent counterparty to a merger is still in the process
of subjecting its criminal counterparty to the former's more robust compliance
policies. One solution would be to stick with the bare bones successor identity
approach described above. If the process is far enough along to reform the
organizational vulnerabilities of the criminal predecessor, the successor does not
share an identity with it and is not liable for its crimes. However, if authorities
interrupt the process before completion, the successor shares an identity with the
criminal predecessor and is fully liable for its crimes. This solution risks
undermining some of the benefits of the successor liability approach. Recall that
the process of reform increases the chance of detection. That being the case,
successors may sometimes find reform too risky a prospect.
A different possibility would draw on degrees of identity. Courts would
have to consider the stage in the process of reform at which authorities
discovered the predecessor's crime. The further along, the lower the degree of
identity, and the greater the mitigation of the successor's liability. This would
still give predecessors and successors ome incentive to get the process of reform
started, even if they feared interruption before completion. It would be easy to
strengthen this incentive and to encourage successors to speed up the process of
reform. Perhaps successors could receive a short window of immunity from
indictment post-reorganization. This would give them some time to initiate and
follow-through on reform projects without worrying that the process of reform
risks drawing the attention of authorities.
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VI. Conclusion: Beyond Successors and Predecessors
Under current corporate criminal law, criminal liability is infectious. Once
a corporation commits a crime, any of its successors will be liable for
punishment. While this approach may seem to have robust deterrent effects, it
ultimately undermines corporate criminal law's deterrent, rehabilitative, and
retributive goals. On the approach proposed here, a successor would only be
liable for a predecessor's crimes if the two shared a criminal identity, i.e., the
organizational trait that was responsible for the predecessor's misconduct. The
successor would not be liable, however, if the process of reorganization
somehow reformed that trait or transferred it to a different successor.
This new approach would encourage criminal predecessors and their
successors to rehabilitate by ridding themselves of organizational vulnerabilities.
It would also strengthen the deterrent effect of corporate criminal law. By
encouraging reform, it would increase the likelihood that individual employees
would face consequences for their misconduct. Finally, because the successor
identity approach aligns with folk judgments about corporate identity, it should
satisfy retributivists by ensuring successors are only punished for crimes they
committed.
Though the framing conceit for this Article has been the transfer of criminal
liability from predecessors to successors in reorganization, the problems it raises
are endemic to corporate criminal law more broadly. Even without reorganizing,
corporations can undergo some equally dramatic changes: they can rebrand,
change lines of business, gain and lose shareholders, change management,
turnover employees, etc. They can also shore up their compliance, improve their
ethos, or otherwise reform organizational traits that might dispose them to
misconduct. One might ask whether corporate criminal law could be doing more
to incentivize corporations to undergo these latter, socially beneficial changes.
The arguments advanced above suggest he answer is "yes." The incentive
structure corporations face when considering whether to investigate and patch
vulnerabilities is the same, regardless of whether they are, at the same time,
reorganizing. The process of self-investigation and reform increases the
likelihood that authorities will catch wind of a violation.220 Regardless of how
the corporation responds, it will be liable as a matter of law for the crimes of its
employees.221 Hoping for a favorable exercise of prosecutorial charging
discretion is cool comfort.222 With the rise of deferred prosecution agreements,
220. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 84, at 337 ("Given that policing imposes direct costs
on the firm, we know that the government cannot induce effective policing unless the firm's total expected
penalties if it engages in optimal policing are lower than if it does not. This presents a challenge for
corporate liability because policing increases the probability that the firm is sanctioned for any and all
crimes that are not deterred.").
221. Assuming the minimal requirements of respondeat superior are satisfied.
222. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 113, § 9-28.1000 cmt. ("In addition to employee
discipline, two other factors used in evaluating a corporation's remedial efforts are restitution and reform
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many corporations feel that prosecutorial favor still means a hefty payment,
albeit one imposed by a prosecutor rather than a sentencing judge.
223
Criminal law could encourage corporations to reform themselves by giving
them some formal reprieve for doing so. Drawing on the concept of successor
identity advanced above, one option would be to recognize a break in corporate
criminal identity if a corporation reforms its problematic ethos or compliance
vulnerabilities. This would reward corporations who undertake the risk and
expense of detecting, investigating, and responding to internal misconduct by
eliminating or mitigating their liability for it. The reformed corporate defendant
could claim in court that some past version of itself, with which it no longer
shares a criminal identity, committed the crimes of which it stands accused. The
benefits of adopting such an approach would likely mirror those of moving from
successor liability to the successor identity approach.
Even readers who are unpersuaded of the advantages of replacing successor
liability with the successor identity approach may see some advantage to
reflecting on the malleability of corporate identity. Corporations, in this respect,
are fundamentally different individuals. There is no need to restrict the
possibilities of corporate criminal law by the limitations of the individual form.
Corporate identity is one more perspective from which to appreciate the unique
criminal justice challenges and opportunities of the corporate context.
.... [A] corporation's quick recognition of the flaws in the program and its efforts to improve the program
are also factors to consider as to the appropriate disposition of a case.").
223. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1896, 1903 (2005)
(explaining the prevalence of DPAs and NPAs replacing "declination[s] in the corporate context").
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